IOC/OSC Transformation

In FY2000, the U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command began to transform itself as part of the Revolution in Military Logistics (RML) and became the U.S. Army Operations Support Command (PROV) on 31 March, 2000. It became fully established as the U.S. Army Operations Support Command on 30 September 2000. During this time period it was under the command of Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Arbuckle.

To embody the new command, a new Distinctive Unit Crest was developed and approved in August 2000 by the Institute for Heraldry. The three points of the yellow stylized caltrop symbolize resolve, spirit and professionalism. The silver disc voided by the triangle represents unity. The triangle represents stability and strength. The black gear wheel represents efficient support to soldiers around the world and industrial operations. The black bomb with red flames signifies the command’s ordnance mission. The light blue globe, with gridlines in silver, represents the scope of the missions and sustained field support. The silver sword represents combat readiness and the command’s support to soldiers. The reversed silver chevron symbolizes the command’s provision of the single point of entry for all Army Materiel Command units to Army Field Commanders.

The core competencies for the OSC changed from those of IOC. The new core competencies were: AMC’s single face to the field, force projection and sustainment, and munitions and industrial operations.

The RML is the overarching vision of logistics transformation that leverages technology to provide seamless support to the war-fighter. Key tasks that must be performed are: to perform realistic analysis of the war-fighter’s needs, change business processes, integrate information technology, and evaluate the overall logistical support capability. This will contribute to the Army’s transformation by taking advantage of opportunities to reduce and sustain requirements, establishing logistics responsiveness of life cycle management processes, and continuing a strong partnership with industry.

Prior to assuming command of IOC/OSC, then Brigadier General Arbuckle had crafted a new strategy for Army-wide logistical support. As a complement to “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” “The Revolution in Military Logistics” (RML) provided a view of the transformation required to support the Warfighter in the new millennium. Consequently, IOC and its Army War Reserve Support Command formed the nucleus of what eventually became the Operations Support Command and its subordinates, Field Support Command and Munitions and Armaments Command.
Major Organizational Changes

Two subordinate commands were formed under the OSC. The Munitions and Armaments Center became the Munitions and Armaments Command (MAC), under the command of Col. Lawrence J. Sowa. The MAC continued to manage munitions and industrial operations. The Army War Reserve Support Command was transformed into the U.S. Army Field Support Command (FSC), under the command of Brig. Gen. Jerome Johnson. The FSC took on the added responsibilities of managing the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), and the Army’s Logistics Support Elements that provide field sustainment support during times of crisis.

Organizational changes were also made to the headquarters that were designed to allow it to operate more effectively in its new roles and responsibilities.

Another major change that occurred in the command was that the operational control of Pine Bluff Arsenal transferred from then IOC to the U.S. Army Soldier, Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) on 1 October 1999, with command and control scheduled for 1 October 2000.

Support to the Warfighter/ LOGCAP

The OSC impacted the nation’s war fighters in two major areas. One area was in the ammunition stockpile. The mission was to outload the kind of ammunition requested, in the right condition, and transport it to the right place at the right time for the war fight. To this end, in particular within the depots, OSC pushed the Army Strategic Mobility Plan to enhance the infrastructure condition, particularly in updating railroads, information systems and outloading platforms.

OSC realized that it did not have sufficient people to handle the equipment at its installations to outload and meet the wartime requirements. A major study was conducted and the Logistic Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) organization contracted to augment the workforce in time of crisis. OSC also approached the Reserve component for approximately 18 companies to help the depots in outloading ammunition. All of these efforts were taken to enhance OSC’s readiness to support war fighting.

Support to the Warfighter/ War Fighting Stocks

The OSC and its subordinate, Field Support Command (FSC), made major efforts to obtain additional funding to enhance the fighatability of our Army War Reserves stocks worldwide, on the ground, and on ships during FY00. OSC voiced these issues all the way to the Chief of Staff of the Army. OSC informed him of the funding posture and readiness conditions for essential warfighting stocks. As a result, the OSC received more funding and made progress in this area.

Army Strategic Mobility Program

Through the Army Strategic Mobility Program, Tier I plants were acquiring new loading docks and other new facilities to outload munitions. These major improvements will benefit the command for quite a few years. The upgrading also included Tier II ammunition plants as well as Tier I. During Desert Storm, OSC outloaded ammunition to support the war effort from 18-20 sites all over the world. During FY00 the OSC was down to just four Tier I depots and four Tier II depots. There was a concern
that if the OSC conducted a massive outload, there would have been choke points. There is a physical limit on how much ammunition can be outloaded from the facilities. Maj. Gen. Arbuckle believed that the Army had to rethink the Tiering concept and recognize that all the depots may essentially be Tier I's for certain kinds of munitions. This became part of the OSC Strategic Plan.

Armament TRIAD

Maj. Gen. Atbuckle also recognized that since the Vietnam War, the historic link between ammunition plants and arsenals with the research and development centers had faded. He endeavored to overcome this through the formation of the Armament TRIAD. It consisted of a partnership between Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey, and the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Ground Combat and Support System. The partnership focused on improving the life cycle management of ammunition. The TRIAD Executive Council was established as a working level team that supported the TRAID.

Y2K

News Years Eve 1999 was a “dark and unstormy” night. Three years of preparations for Y2K throughout the command paid off and there were no major computer problems at any of the worldwide locations. Sixty percent of the 20,000 personal computers, twenty percent of the commercial software packages, and 800 of the 2,000 business systems on mainframe computers had been fixed. Thousands of items in other categories also needed to be checked.

Environmental Achievements

The IOC/OSC has more installations than any other command in AMC, including, unfortunately, most of the Superfund sites and sites with other environmental issues. During FY00 the OSC was quite creative in developing and utilizing solutions for its environmental problems. One example was using bio-remediation technology to neutralize contamination in the soil or water, as opposed to the filtering type approaches or burning the soil.

Transfers of Army Property

Excess/inactive OSC installations continued not only with their environmental clean up but also with transferring parcel’s of land back to the public domain. As a result of BRAC actions, for example, Savanna Army Depot Activity and Seneca Army Depot Activity were closed and inactivation ceremonies were held in FY 00. The Seneca Army Depot Activity enclave was reassigned from OSC to Soldier and Biological Command (SBCCOM) on 1 October 2000. Plans were put in place to transfer portions of the installations to local redevelopment authorities.

Another example was at the Joliet Army Ammunition Plant where in August of 2000 Secretary of the Army Caldera transferred 2,038 acres to the state of Illinois for two industrial parks. Acreage was also transferred to states and local communities at Cornhusker Army Ammunition Plant, Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant, Alabama Army Ammunition Plant, Ravenna Army Ammunition Plant, and Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant.

Arsenal Act
The IOC/OSC made a major effort during Maj. Gen. Arbuckle’s tenure to get the Arsenal Act applied according to its intent. The Commanding General believed that the Arsenal Act was timeless and still as applicable as it was when it was written in 1922. Congress recognized that taxpayers and the Army had invested a significant amount of money in the Arsenals to maintain them. With that in mind, Congress passed the Arsenal Act to ensure the nation received a payback from those arsenals. The Act basically said that the Secretary of the Army shall consider using the Arsenals in any defense manufacturing work. It stated that the Army was to use an economic comparison in making decisions on the location of manufacturing work. The whole intent was to put work into the arsenals and not let them stand idle. In other words, to keep their smokestacks warm and the shops ready for production in the event of a national emergency. In more recent years, the Arsenal Act was not really applied to the acquisition strategies and approaches. Consequently, the workload dried up at the arsenals.

Workload decisions have a lot to do with the acquisition process within the Army. Over the last ten years, the Army focused on the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), which stated that Program Managers (PM) and Program Executive Officers (PEO) would use full and open competition. That reasoning was used as opposed to the Arsenal Act. Arsenals did not receive part of that work because typically the cost of their work was higher than the customer wanted to pay. That occurred because the workload at the arsenals was down and therefore their rates were high. So PMs did not use the Arsenals. Under Maj. Gen. Arbuckle’s leadership, IOC/OSC pushed the philosophy that the Arsenals must win over the PMs and the PEOs.

**Partnering with Industry**

Part of the IOC/OSC strategy was to seek modernization dollars by teaming with the private sector. The IOC/OSC achieved success in this area through the use of a long-term contract vehicle that encouraged industry to invest their private money to modernize OSC facilities. The hope was that contractors would be more willing to invest their own funds with the longer-term agreement as opposed to annual contracts.

One highlight of this partnering with industry and the consequential modernization efforts throughout the command was at Holston Army Ammunition Plant. Royal Ordnance of North America was selected through competition as the plant’s new operating contractor. The terms of agreement included Royal Ordnance actually shutting down the plant for a year. During the shutdown they planned to invest several million dollars to modernize the plant and make it more efficient to operate smaller production runs.

Another example of using this philosophy to attract outside tenants to essentially offset our cost of ownership was the continuation of the Armament Retooling Manufacturing Support (ARMS) strategy. The master lease and the joint entity at Rock Island Arsenal exemplified this program.

**Strategic Planning**

The added responsibilities represented a significant new direction for IOC/OSC. During July 2000, Major General Arbuckle sponsored and participated in an OSC Strategic Planning session, including
attendees from higher headquarters and customer organizations. The result was an OSC Strategic Direction that Major General Arbuckle approved and would be promulgated in October 2000:

**Mission**: The Operations Support Command (OSC) serves as the foundation to help Army Materiel Command (AMC) transform to the Army Readiness Command (ARC) as the Army’s “single logistics provider.” The OSC postures AMC to lead the Revolution in Military Logistics (RML) and implement the Combat Service/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) transformation by providing a synchronized face to the war fighter (CINC’s/ASCC). The OSC exercises centralized command and control over AMC Forward Commands and OPCON (-) over other AMC field activities strengthening an integrated structure for readiness knowledge and logistics support worldwide. This Command will continue to perform the Army War Reserve mission for the Army and the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) mission for the Department of Defense.

**OSC Core Competencies**: The OSC will provide logistical support for the entire Army in its full spectrum of operations ranging from disaster and humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement to regional contingencies - all the way to major theater conflict. To support the wide-breadth of this Command’s mission and the AMC & Army Transformation, the OSC will exercise three core competencies: AMC’s Single Face to the Field, Force Projection and Sustainment, and Munitions and Industrial Operations.

**OSC Vision**: Provide force projection and force sustainment support to the Warfighter, anywhere in the world within Army transformation guidelines, by moving AMC forward to the battle space with a single point of entry for logistics support.

**OSC Strategic Direction**: To effectively develop the OSC strategic direction, it is important to understand the future planning of AMC as the Army Readiness Command (ARC) and the ARC role as the Army’s “Single Logistics Provider.” The OSC will fully implement the AMC Commanding General’s vision by implementation and execution of the following strategic direction as the “Army’s single global logistics integrator” as well as manage and execute the Army War Reserve and DOD SMCA missions:

- **AMC’s Single Face to the Field**: The basic premise of the OSC is to move AMC forward on the battlefield as the AMC single face to the field for logistics. Our people will translate the needs and requirements of the Warfighter so they can be acted upon by logistics providers, link the information back to the sustaining base, and integrate the support from the sustaining base so the Warfighter has a true “single source.”

- **Provide a Seamless Logistics System**: A basic premise of the OSC, as the “on the line” organization, is to provide a seamless logistics system. Characteristics of this seamless system are global and distribution-based; predictive/mobile/agile; operational readiness knowledge; and real-time situational awareness and anticipatory logistics by understanding the war fighters requirements (via Operational Plans (OPLANS), Contingency Plans (CONPLANS), and operational support).

- **Execute Army War Reserve Mission**: The OSC will continue to serve as the Army war reserve equipment manager through continued execution of the maintenance, storage, issue, receipt, and configuration of the Army’s worldwide prepositioned war reserve equipment.
Perform Munitions and Armaments Mission. The OSC will execute and manage the SMCA mission by serving as the overall conventional munitions and industrial base manager through continued performance of the ammunition out-load, stockpile, and production missions. It will also manage the armament arsenals and the Army’s Defense Ammunition Center. The OSC will extend munitions support further into the battlefield (Ammunition Supply Points (ASP’s)) and locate Logistics Assistance Representatives (LAR’s) within the logistics support elements. In addition, the OSC will develop the basis for integrating the munitions research and development with the munitions production and stockpile management operations.

Strategic Enablers: To effectively implement ARC/OSC’s transformation, several enablers will be required as follows:

1. **Execute Single Stock Fund and National Maintenance Program.** The SSF and NMP are key steps to RML’s success. The OSC will work with the ARC to assume the role as executor of the Single Stock Fund and National Maintenance Programs. These programs enable a seamless logistics system to occur by linking OSC to the field and by moving this Command and ARC closer to the customer. SSF/NMP will merge the wholesale and retail supply and maintenance capability and management across the Army to reduce the logistics footprint both CONUS and OCONUS. This new role is vital to the success of the OSC as the integrator of global logistics support.

2. **Enhance Logistics Automation and Communication.** The OSC will have an integrated capability to provide logistics real-time situational awareness. We will implement a reliable, accurate, seamless logistics system that provides real-time asset visibility and unit operational capability assessments via an instantaneous, reliable, worldwide communications net. The OSC will ensure full Implementation of Army automated systems (i.e., GCSS-A, LOGMOD, etc.), which will allow Army wide asset visibility for the first time.

3. **Achieve Customer Expectations & Establish Credible Relationships.** The OSC will work hard to win the confidence of our customers. We will listen hard to what they are telling us and work diligently to see the world through their eyes. We will work with our customers to understand their needs, the value of being responsive, and what it takes to provide a logistics system that gives the warfighter confidence to fight. As we do this with our customers, we will discover that we must pay more attention to our own employees and our suppliers. By listening to and understanding them, will help us to deal more effectively with the field Army. Getting the job done is a matter of building credible relationships as much as it is about command and control. Trust, confidence, open communications, and the ability to respond to the needs of others will characterize OSC relationships (both internal and external to the command).

4. **Acquire and Manage Resources (Organization - Manpower Skills and Staffing - Funding - Training).** The OSC will obtain resources to operate a properly sized, skilled, and funded organization to meet all mission requirements. We have realistically assessed what we must and can achieve with current and programmed resources, and have made hard decisions to devote resources accordingly. This involved suspending or ending action on other less critical requirements, divesting ourselves of collateral mission/facilities, and reassigning capital resources where needed. We will look at mid and long-term mission requirements and the required workforce skills and training needed. We will perform gap analyses to determine resource shortfalls and design an optimal organization to best support the current/future mission. We will continue to improve business processes to optimize resources. We will recruit, develop and maintain the highly skilled and diverse workforce necessary to accomplish the current and future strategic goals efficiently and effectively. We will identify, document, and budget for the optimum organization to fulfill mission requirements.
OSC Overarching Strategies – Corporate Level:

- Mission & Processes
- Army’s Single Face to the Field
- Provide Seamless Logistics System
- Execute Army War Reserve
- Perform Munitions & Armaments Mission
- Execute Single Stock Fund (SSF) and National Maintenance Program (enabler)
- Enhance Logistics Automation and Communication (enabler)
- Achieve Customer Expectations & Establish Credible Relationships (enabler)
- Acquire and Manage Resources (Optimal Organization - Manpower Skills and Staffing – Funding – Training)
- Manage and Acquire Adequate Resources (enabler)

Total Army Quality

MG Arbuckle was a believer in the Total Army Quality (TAQ) approach. He had experience with TAQ with two previous commands before coming to HQ, IOC/OSC. He wanted to institutionalize a TAQ structure at IOC/OSC headquarters and then spread it out to the field commands. He believed that TAQ was really about good leadership approaches; that it started with having a vision for the organization and communicating that vision to the workforce; that it also had to do with having a customer focus and recognizing that organizations do not exist for themselves – that they exist because they have a mission and customers to support. TAQ means that organizations know who their customers are and what they want. It also means that it is important to empower people to go out and do things, to give them a charter and let them do it. Metrics, measuring what is important, was the third major element of the OSC TAQ implementation.

As part of the TAQ metrics, OSC was one of the first major subordinate commands within AMC to implement Activity Based Costing (ABC) Management. The purpose was to use the tool to determine the relationships between resources expended and products and services provided. An Integrated Process Team was formed in the spring of 2000 to spearhead the detailed analysis of the ABC database, to determine training requirements, and to make recommendations regarding the ABC hierarchy and its adaptation to the ATAAPS labor collection tool. This was part of the movement towards Activity Based Management.

Support to Operations

The command sponsored Operation Golden Cargo 2000 that began June 5. Various areas of 3d Corps Support Command conducted the exercise. It allowed soldiers from Army National Guard and active components, Department of Defense civilians, and contractors to support critical outloading and supply depot operations. High explosive rounds were transported from Red River Munitions Center, Texas, to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma. Multiple Launch Rocket Systems were transported from the contractor at Camden, Arkansas, to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant. Palletization and rewarehousing of explosives was done at Ravenna Army Ammunition plant, Ohio. Finally, safety in storage inspections were accomplished at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant and Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Indiana. OSC was also involved in TURBOCADS 2000.
Emergency Operations Center

Maj. Gen. Arbuckle strongly believed that having a viable operations center was critical to OSC executing its mission, in particular, the FSC mission. The requirements were: the ability to monitor worldwide, in real time, within 15 minutes anywhere the Army has a readiness problem. This included a system that started with the Logistic Assistance Representatives (LARs), who were located with divisional units in the field worldwide. A system was needed that would translate what the LARs know simultaneously throughout AMC. Maj. Gen. Arbuckle believed that the systems had to be anticipatory and help keep up with worldwide events. It was determined that two pieces, a knowledge piece and a physical piece, needed to be upgraded to determine the knowledges required and the systems in place to gather that knowledge. A new physical facility was required. Plans were put into place to modify space vacated by the Defense Information System Agency (DISA) to create a new OSC Emergency Operations Center.

Personnel Issues

One of Maj. Gen. Arbuckle’s top three long term worries for the command was the personnel situation. He saw it as an AMC wide problem, not just an IOC/OSC concern. The average age of the OSC workforce was about 49 years of age. In addition, there had been hiring freezes for many years. The intern program had for the most part dried up. There also had been little opportunity for promotion in the middle ranks. The situation had been very stagnant. However, he saw a simple solution. There were a lot of people waiting to retire on Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA) and/or take Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay (VSIP). He questioned, “Why don't we let them? Why not open up of the window? Let those who qualify retire in mass. Let's not worry about the current VERA/VSIP rules where you have to trace it back to saving a job.” He understood that it would have to be controlled. He wanted DA and AMC to give HQ, OSC the authority to hire up to the Program Budget Guidance (PPG) level. He believed and pushed for something radical to fix the personnel crisis – mass hiring authority.

Another personnel issue was the need to develop a multi-skilled workforce in order to succeed in its logistics and acquisition mission. Over time the command had lost its ability to replace talent. Maj. Gen. Arbuckle’s approach was to push the development of a multi-skilled workforce. The idea was to cross train the workforce so each individual understands two or three jobs instead of just one. In order to accomplish that, he instituted putting as much as 2 - 2 1/2 percent of the annual salary into training and insisted that training plans be developed. In addition, the OSC Board of Directors (BOD) decided to pursue a personnel demo, which would mandate that OSC would train people and performance into evaluations and promotions.

COMMAND CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT, FY00

Headquarters On Board Strength (Rock Island)

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<th></th>
<th>Start (1 Oct 99)</th>
<th>End (30 Sep 00)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,320 Civilian,</td>
<td>1,186 Civilian,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46 Military</td>
<td>45 Military</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 1,366</td>
<td>Total 1,231</td>
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Command On Board Strength

Start (1 Oct 99) 16,650 Civilian, 214 Military Total 16,864
End (30 Sep 00) 8,198 Civilian, 150 Military Total 8,348

COMMANDING GENERAL AND SENIOR STAFF (date of incumbency)

Major General Joseph W. Arbuckle, Commanding General, 24 September 1998
Col (P) Jerome Johnson, Deputy Commanding General, 11 August 1999
(promoted to Brigadier General 29 Sept 2000)
Colonel Robert A. Benson, Chief of Staff, 25 August 1999
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Blackburn, Secretary of the General Staff, 21 August 1998
Command Sergeant Major Lynnell Sullivan, 24 February 1996