



U.S. ARMY FIELD SUPPORT COMMAND



**MAJOR GENERAL WADE H. MCMANUS, JR.
COMMANDING GENERAL
U.S. ARMY FIELD SUPPORT COMMAND**

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

**U.S. ARMY FIELD SUPPORT COMMAND AND JOINT MUNITIONS COMMAND
SUPPORT TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, PHASES I-III**

DECEMBER 2003



**FEBRUARY 2004
AFSC Command Historian
HQ, U.S. Army Field Support Command
Rock Island, Illinois 61299-6500**

Cover Photograph: Major General Wade H. McManus, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army Field Support Command is greeted by Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher in AMC-LSE-SWA during his visit to the theater of operations where AFSC manages prepositioned stock in Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.

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Introduction

The U.S. Army Field Support Command (AFSC) and U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command (JMC) were key players in logistics support to the warfighter during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Our support began within hours of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. The Operations Center was on around-the-clock operations in minutes, and ammunition was shipped to customers within 11 hours. The AFSC and JMC have continued their critical support ever since to include work in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Kuwait, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern countries. The commands have provided ammunition support, Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), Logistics Support Elements (LSEs), Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracting, and logistics horizontal integration within AMC and to the warfighters. That support continues to this day.

Major General Wade H. McManus, Jr. has been the Commander of AFSC and JMC since October 2000 and led the commands throughout the Global War on Terrorism. He has guided the commands as they ramped-up to support combat operations. The ramp-up periods were critical to the success experienced in combat. During the Korean War and Vietnam it took the Army 18 to 24 months to get the ammunition production system on-line at rates that met requirements. In those cases the ramp-up occurred after our soldiers were already in combat. During the GWOT most of the production increases were in place before our troops were in combat. During Desert Storm it took the Army almost six months to ship all its combat equipment to the desert. This time, AFSC was able to methodically prepare equipment already in Southwest Asia, reposition stocks in theater, and download prepositioned ships. The equipment was in place when the warfighters arrived and needed it. LOGCAP planners had gone through different scenarios and cut their teeth in Afghanistan and the Philippines. By the time services were needed in Kuwait and Iraq, the process was known and the people experienced.

In the middle of supporting combat operations, the AFSC and JMC underwent a series of organizational changes. The name was changed from Operations Support Command to the Joint Munitions Command. This was done to reflect the command's joint mission in the supply of conventional munitions to all the Services. Then, as part of AMC and Army Transformation, the AFSC became a Major Subordinate Command of AMC and JMC became a subordinate command of AFSC. This was done to reflect the evolving missions of the two commands and the increased importance of the AFSC missions to logistics transformation and the management of logistics to the warfighter. Throughout these changes, MG McManus was able to continue his leadership and implement his long-term visions for the commands.

The following interviews cover MG McManus' views on both AFSC and JMC mission areas.

The AFSC History office conducted this Oral History interview with MG McManus on 15 and 29 December 2003. We covered AFSC/JMC support to GWOT with an emphasis on support to Operation Iraqi Freedom during Phases I-III (Predeployment, Deployment, and Decisive Operations, 11 September 2001 – 30 April 2003). More work will be done to cover MG McManus' views and experiences during operations after 1 May 2003. Ms. L. Janette Voss

conducted the interview on 15 December and George Eaton conducted the interview on 29 December. Some of the questions on 29 December were follow-up and clarifications. These questions have been inserted where they make the best sense. Some other questions and answers have been rearranged. The original transcripts in the original order are on file at the AFSC Historian Office. Editorial inserts are included in [] brackets.

In addition to this Oral History with MG McManus, the AFSC History Office has several other oral history projects. We are conducting oral histories with most AFSC/JMC employees who deployed to SWA in support of OIF and OEF. We are also interviewing key employees who support the effort from home station. These interviews will be made available on line and we are conducting analysis for trends and potential lessons learned. We are also conducting command tour and end of career oral histories with MG McManus and other AFSC/JMC senior leaders. If you want information on any of these oral histories, please contact the AFSC Historian Office.

George Eaton
AFSC Command Historian

AFSC/JMC Support to OIF Phase I-III

The following portion of the Oral History was conducted on 15 December 2003 at MG McManus' office, AFSC Headquarters, Rock Island, IL. This portion of the interview was conducted by Ms L. Janette Voss, AFSC Historian Office and primarily covers Phases I and II, Predeployment and Deployment.

AFSC/JMC Transformation

VOSS: What changes did you have to put into place to transform the commands into efficient organizations to support Phase I, Predeployment?

MCMANUS: Well, a lot of the changes to help us began way before 9/11. In this history, we ought to go back and look at the commander's vision when I first got here in October of 2000 and then some of the themes that I came to the command with. As you may recall, a big part of our effort was recognizing that we are a global organization, we operate in virtually every time zone that exists in the globe, and so our first big push to prepare ourselves for this was getting our operation center concept going. The initial concept was called Global Logistics Information Dominance. This is not the sermon, but it kind of sets the stage. It used to be, I'd call in here when I was in Korea. If you called to Rock Island after 5:00, the phone would be answered with the following: "Hello. Rock Island [Arsenal] Fire Station." Because, if you called here after 5:00, all phones are forwarded to the fire station security offices.

So, we began down a path of organizing ourselves for potential global operations, possibly simultaneously in many time zones. That transformation piece actually began even before we had any idea we were going to go into OIF or any operations like that. So, I think the actions taken in the early stages of command -- then it was the Operations Support Command -- were taken with the notion of-- and this is kind of the bumper sticker-- if we're global, and we're operation support, we gotta be prepared to take these phone calls. So we began with a 24/7 operation. A big part of our continuing transformation efforts put us into a operation center review, redesign, and buildup here so that we could be more effective in the global domain for corresponding with our forward deployed forces, processing their requirements for support, providing them a round-the-clock capability here to tie into for any issues they may have. And it's been commented on repeatedly by the folks who deployed. In fact, Clay Newman [BG Larry C. Newman], who is currently the CFLCC, Command Forces Land Component Command, C4 told me, I mean, if he told me once, he told me probably 25 times, if not more, he said, "Sir, your operations center is absolutely the very best. The very best." So, for me, the transformational actions took place way before then, and it's consistent with the transformation timeline. If you read today, in the private sector, it takes organizations probably at least three to five years to transform. I've been fortunate in my time here to kind of see that transformation process begin with a vision, and a change in how we manage operations here, a change in how we stay connected to the field, to getting into the testing, if you will.

And the second piece is, to help us, you may recall we had to go through with the massive mobilization associated with this. We had to effectively integrate our Individual Mobilization Augmentation, the reserve components, bring in other individuals and organizations and keep those in the command's operating structure. That was the next big challenge we faced in transforming ourselves to meet the demands of a very dynamic operation that we were already in the throes of.

VOSS: During Phase I through III, you commanded JMC. FSC was a subordinate command. How did you manage the different missions of the two commands?

MCMANUS: Well, I came along at a unique time in the history of the organization because when I got here it was Operation Support Command as the parent command with the Field Support Command as a subordinate, and the ammunition piece was then called the Munitions and Armaments Command, the MAC. So, the issue for me, as the Commander, and the training of me as a Commander began on Day 1, with the command having those multiple mission areas. What became apparent to us as we traveled our evolutionary path as it turned out to be, is that whether it's field support or prepositioned support or ammunition, through this command's vital missions we are truly and totally inextricably linked to the warfighter. From that perspective we learned to devise and design our operations meetings so we could capitalize. We were able to turn -- this is a great Civil War phrase I learned on a recent staff ride, where I think it was General -- it might have been Grant -- the key to success for him was turning advantages into accomplishments. What we did was, we just turned our advantages, in terms of our knowledge of the munitions logistics area, our knowledge and expertise in preposition, we turned those into mission accomplishments. I think that helped the command to self-evolve, if you will, on its own. It's almost like we were thrust into the operation naturally, and everybody in the organization just responded magnificently. How to answer your question is, for me, the preparation to command the organizations as I've had to do, was a function of how we began and which is why I think you'll find the two commands will always be connected. Because the parallels are so extreme in terms of the connectivity to the war fighter.

VOSS: Early on when you were the OSC CG did you spend more time focusing on the ammo mission than the FSC mission?

MCMANUS: There was another aspect to this, as we got into OIF, probably more into Phase 2 and Phase 3. You recall that the CG of the Field Support Command was in a Brigadier General position, and the BG deployed to Kuwait to command the AMC forward element there. Even before that happened, the ammunition outloading was a mission in and of itself, so I think the way I would answer that is, it's not that I did one or the other. I would focus my attention based upon the exigencies of the mission requirements at the time. Initially it was outloading several forces -- we learned some valuable lessons about how we had ammunition stored at the time that we've since corrected. So my attention was a function of the mission requirements at the time. If you go back, if you actually kind of did a balance sheet, you'd probably find that I didn't weight one or the other, I just

weighted them in time and space as they were factors in either the deployment or the operation, or in some cases now, redeployment. So that's kind of how you operate.

VOSS: The operations center was a big success, and that was beginning to be implemented even before September 11th and the resulting war on terrorism. But are there any other changes that needed to be made during that period that will be permanent, or are there some things that the command will shift back to pre-OIF/OEF structure?

MCMANUS: I don't know if this is the answer you're looking for, but this came up a couple of times. One of the things that I chose to do in this general time period was to go ahead and take risk in developing leaders. Because before I arrived, everybody had grown up in their own little stovepipe career path. I don't mean that negatively, I mean, it's just they were kind of boxed in by their own experiences and career path. I recall on a couple of occasions I got e-mails from the troops on this saying, "Sir, what are you thinking about? I can't believe you're doing this. We're at war, and you're changing leaders." But, it was my belief at the time, if I did not make those changes and then help guide these folks through some structure, and how we were managing our global operations here, that I would have missed an opportunity for the command to come into its own in this century.

So, will it go back? You can never go back again. We've continued to look at leader development and leader rotations, a way of making sure our leaders are multi-skilled, multi-functional, who can actually handle, who can manage and understand as many of the command's missions as possible. I have toyed with the idea and, in fact, the question came up the other day in the town hall, are they going to do another leader rotation while I'm still here. And I've thought about, should I go back and put Humpty Dumpty together as it was before I knocked him off the wall? No, we are a different command today than we were a year ago, two years ago, three years ago, and it would serve no purpose to go back in that regard. So the issue for us is continuing to thrive and build on what has made the command as successful as it is, and that's its people. Both its leaders and the led making sure the missions can get executed. There are probably just countless numbers of examples, in every staff section, that could be recorded from a historical perspective it would demonstrate how important that was for the future of the command.

Phase I - Predeployment

VOSS: When did the AFSC/JMC begin supporting the pre-deployment phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom?

MCMANUS: Actually, our involvement began with the World Trade Center attacks. Because, as we briefed this a number of times here, when that happened, literally within a couple of hours, we had received notification to begin shipping bombs to various locations. We had delivered munitions within 11 1/2 hours. We knew then that America was going to take some sort of action. We didn't know what, but we knew we'd have a role. So that immediate demand for ammunition kind of gave us some insights into what we thought was going to be a pretty high intensity operation.

I'd also tell you that, I think it was two days after the World Trade Center attacks, I was flown to Washington, DC, to brief the Chief of Staff of the Army on our ability to support a potentially multi-front operation. The reason I remember that is because, as you recall, that's when all the planes were grounded, and the only planes that were flying were military aircraft. And I can recall vividly, I think it was like the 13th or 14th of September, being the only plane in the air, flying to Washington, DC to get to the Pentagon and brief the Chief of Staff of the Army. At that stage, before we got into the current OIF as we know it today here, our involvement began. At the same time, remember now, we are a globally positioned organization. And when one considers the capability that we are responsible for within the command, specifically the Army Preposition Stock [APS] program and the fact it is globally arrayed, when you take a look at the locations afloat, land-based, some here in the United States but mostly forward deployed-- Korea, Europe, Germany, Italy, the BENELUX as well, then you [include] Kuwait and Qatar. Our [initial] predeployment support was ramping up to be prepared to issue out of [APS] because we'd not really executed a conflict since we've had the program.

So, as far as that ramp up here, we began looking at overseas, looking at the levels of readiness we had in the program here, looking at our staffing levels, because we also knew that in most cases, our tables of distribution and allowances [TDA] only allowed us enough for what we would call normal peacetime operations. You may recall that we had built into the program the augmentation and mobilization TDAs to go with that, so at the same time, as we were beginning and looking at equipment issues and supply issues that we were responsible for, we began looking at what it would take now to round these organizations out by activating the mobilization TDA.

I'd go back and look at events themselves [that] drove us to get involved in the predeployment phase, because shortly after that, we began looking at how we're gonna commit forces. Our first big involvement was outloading ammunition to support the deploying force. At the same time ramping up our many LAOs, Logistics Assistance Offices, within the divisions, posts, camps, and stations. They were tapped to deploy and support the operation. And so from the totality of the command, I mean, we were literally in every aspect of getting ourselves ready, getting our forces ready, supporting deployment, deploying ourselves. At this same time we were ramping up operations on the other end, because at that time we knew we were going to go into operation somewhere in Southwest Asia, so it's kinda how that unfolded, if you will, across the spectrum of the things we were responsible for.

VOSS: What kinds of things did we do to support the ammo mission in the predeployment phase?

MCMANUS: Biggest thing we had to do was, on very short timelines, satisfy a deploying joint force with their ammunition basic load requirements. That was the biggest thing we had to do. The second thing, and it was done simultaneously because we were connected with CENTCOM and Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), we were also building up the theater ammunition stock posture. So we were doing runs -- analyses

is a better word -- for the organizations, on what it would take based upon their OPLAN requirements. And so as we were outloading and doing stuff like that to support the deploying force we're also under tremendous pressure to raise the availability of ammunition to support the warfighter's future requirements.

I think what we're seeing unfold right now, I was working on an e-mail before you came in on this very same topic here, [is that] the funding profile of ammunition for many of the key mission areas has been woefully under funded. So, when the issues were made known to the Army's leadership, I remember there was tremendous financial support provided to the program here. I guess after 9/11, in raw magnitude our ammo program went from a funded level base to an increase of over 250%. We had huge challenges in terms of ramping up the command to [execute] a fairly expanded funded program to meet the requirements of the warfighter. So that's how we kind of approached the ammunition piece and the challenges that we faced along the way here. We also found that we learned a lot about the ammunition we had been accepting some years ago. We also learned the value and utility and the credibility of the munitions strategic grading system we put in place to help better manage it and present to the Army munitions readiness issues so they could take action.

VOSS: Now, would that also include reviewing war plans and shifting of stocks, and that kind of thing?

MCMANUS: Well, if it was a stock relocation, we took things out of production [straight from the plants]. We even borrowed ammunition from other services, because as a Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition field operating agency, we had the ability to go back. We had knowledge of the ammunition, knowledge of the orders, knowledge of future requirements. So we would work amongst the services to satisfy the near-term requirements, and then ramp up production to be able to meet what we knew were going to be sustained requirements.

VOSS: So then, it probably warranted implementing new contracts?

MCMANUS: No, no, no, actually I'd say we modified existing contracts. We had to go through tremendous efforts to expand our production capability. That was a big thrust as we got into OIF. And we were fairly confident that it would not be a short duration type of operation, so we had to put our best minds together here to look at how we could improve the building of the industrial base to meet requirements. A quick story about this. Lake City Army Ammunition Plant; when we did that contract several years ago, it was envisioned that they'd be producing about 400,000,000 rounds a year. Well, once we got into OIF, we went from 400,000,000 to over 800,000,000, and now we haven't come below a billion in months. So, here is a capability that was nowhere near prepared to ramp up, and we had to go and develop strategies, investment strategies, both the Army and the private sector, to produce and to increase its production capacity at the same time. So it was a very challenging time for us, you know, to integrate and synchronize these actions because we couldn't miss a beat. We couldn't afford any shutdowns and in this case, the capacity at Lake City far surpassed any others. In fact, we did analysis on this.

If you took all the known global producers of small caliber ammunition, 5.56 mm, and added their capacities together, it would not equal one day's capacity at Lake City. So that's how important a strategic asset Lake City is to us in terms of making small caliber ammunition. These are just one of a number of challenges that we've faced in terms of making industrial base more responsive, to supply the force, and to be able to continue to supply the force as the operation unfolded.

VOSS: How did the Operations Center and our Horizontal Logistics Integration Mission work during the predeployment phase?

MCMANUS: It was extraordinary. I think then I saw that organizations will either excel or crumble under pressure. And I saw a level of maturity, I saw a level of growth, I saw a level of expansion within our people that just, I'm not sure I'm even surprised when I go back and look at this. But, it was just the sheer determination of our people to make this thing work here. It was not without challenge, but I'll tell you, we overcame many of these. I think one of the biggest challenges we faced was the notion of shift work, which was actually a new concept to the command. But we began to talk this up here and people saw there was no way we could ever go back to the days where you called in here at 5:00 and phones were transferred to a security agency. From that standpoint, I think that the Operations Center challenges and the transformation actions that we had to put on their backs, and how they responded were the things I'll always remember about what happens to organizations when they face adversity. As a result, I think the progress we made, and the speed with which we made that progress is what history will record and will be dramatic in terms of the evolution of organization in this culture.

VOSS: Was there ever really a predeployment phase for APS?

MCMANUS: I would almost say that APS is in a constant state of prep for deployment, because it is the Army strategic reserve, for lack of a better phrase here, but it becomes a strategic strike force. It is expected that we do our jobs to keep this stuff maintained to high-level readiness. It is expected that we have the procedures to rapidly, efficiently hand off equipment to a warfighter. It's expected that we, in this process of handoff, can give the warfighter a complete support package to ensure that they can sustain that capability. It's expected that we approach our job everyday in the prepositioned stock program as if we're gonna go to war tomorrow. One of our videos cites one of our great employees here, Barb Zvonik-Siefker, who said, "APS is ready to fight tonight." That places an extraordinary responsibility on our organization, to be able to meet those types of timelines, we are in the instant, we're into combat power on demand. So for us, we are always in the prep for deployment phase of handing off equipment, whether it be Southwest Asia, somewhere in Europe, Korea, Pacific, wherever. I mean, that just comes with the territory of this command. Same with ammunition as well.

VOSS: What kinds of things did we do to support the War Reserve APS mission in the predeployment phase?

MCMANUS: Well, the biggest thing was ensuring the stocks were ready to be downloaded. A tremendous amount of work went into ensuring that equipment that had been out of a maintenance cycle for some time-- we had good indications of what it would require. A big portion of this we knew was going to be the land-based equipment over there as the operation unfolded out of APS 5 [Kuwait and Qatar]-- so from that standpoint the big issues were rounding out equipment shortages, ensuring we had good information on any supply issues that set space. We had a pretty good handle on both that and the readiness piece. The issue we didn't know was how much time we had. And once again, the operation itself did more to reinforce the value of the efforts. Units and soldiers in the 3rd ID were amazingly complimentary about the readiness condition, the equipment, its performance in combat and so forth. So we had a real live test of how well we did our mission in the prepositioned stock program here. And the paper got graded very, very high, as it should have.

VOSS: What did the command do particularly well during Phase I?

MCMANUS: I think responsiveness got high marks. There were some challenges. OK, we faced some adversity in terms of weather, and short timelines for action, and so forth. You look at warning times, ambiguous and unambiguous. When we take an ambiguous warning time scenario here and then your threat becomes very unambiguous, you get great specificity. I think our papers are graded very high on our ability to rapidly get into what we had to and then to react to adversity -- whether it be short timelines, unscheduled maintenance requirements where we had to make the fleets more issuable, or weather-- just acts of nature, ice, storms and so forth, it's like someone's working against you trying to get your mission done here. From that standpoint, our ability to respond was where we got high marks from the folks we were supporting.

VOSS: Where did we stumble, and how did we fix it?

MCMANUS: Probably the biggest area we learned on the ammunition side was, we had stocks malpositioned. As we went from a time phased force deployment, data-based approach to a deployment order kind of structure, we had leveraged an arcane concept called tiering. Tiering was not effective for what we had to do in today's warfare, so as a result, Centralized Ammunition Management (CAM) was born. Here's the case where we learned a lesson and it was not because we did anything bad. It's just that as we went through and we realized what was going to be required of us, that we had to rethink how we could be responsive to our warfighter's requirements.

On the prepo side, the biggest thing was not a material issue. I think the biggest thing there was we learned -- we haven't fixed this today yet - our LSEs [Logistics Support Elements], are fed by the filler system and it's hard for us to have a unit when you're always rotating people in and out of here. So one of the big issues we're dealing with, even still today here, is how you make these organizations like a unit. And so, you organize, equip, and train, as you would fight. We're trying to develop concepts for today or solutions, if you will, so we don't go down this path again. Because the human

resources that we require to man these organizations is not limitless, and that's a big challenge we faced.

EATON: Can we follow up on the LSE manning issue? You talked a little about the LSEs and about how they weren't organized concretely or firmly in their TDAs and this and that. And I thought they had some sort of TDA organization first. Or was I missing your point?

MCMANUS: No, you're right. Let me explain further. When we built the LSE, the LSE always had a cadre TDA with the battle roster round-out. I recall working this piece when I was here my first tour, as well. As we began the planning process, the big issue then was we had difficulty getting the volunteers to put names against the battle roster. This is the point and I probably didn't make the point the first time, I should have, and I'll do it this time here. What I was getting at was from an LSE perspective is the LSE other than the cadre is not a unit. We've been trying to, but we can't fix this in this current rotation plan. So, we employ a cadre with augmentees, fillers. Like in your case. We're trying to resource in multiple rotations, and because our TDA structure doesn't give us the redundancy. In other words, if I employed LSE SWA, I can't pull the LSE out of Korea to replace LSE SWA in a new rotation. And, so, in this regard here, it's not from a pure standpoint -- it is a pure TDA, but the ability to source that TDA is going to change because we're going globally into our resources. As we started deploying, we did not have enough information in terms of how the duration of the operation, the flow of the forces and so forth, so we began pulling people, and they volunteered out of other organizations, we hadn't planned on deploying. So, what we did is we upset the apple cart, so to speak, by taking folks who had habitual relations with the units they were supporting and putting them in a new environment here, and there was no way they could go back and sustain that relationship they built. In this regard, the issue for us, of modularity and flexibility, becomes so important to us. For us, the issue becomes making sure systematically we have the capability of systems and processes in place that are common and understood. We're going to be stuck with the resourcing issues, I think, in any scenario.

EATON: Do you see the division LSEs and the LAO shops out in the installations as a little tighter? I mean, we've got the same rotation problem, but is their structure a little bit tighter than the AMC LSE SWA or LSE Europe?

MCMANUS: Gee, that's a great question, and I think it's going to vary by scenario. For example, as long as the LAO for deployed Division A, that tightness would be better than with the LSE, per se. However, as we take a look at how we structure LSEs, we begin regionally. We made a departure when we went to I Corps because then we built an LSE forward capability, but we're not deploying it as such. So again, I think we have some inconsistencies in how we employ this. And, oh, by the way, we need to begin to look at how we may look at the future force and the fighting force in command and control. We talked about LSEs being organized around corps. Well, again, you may not be able to have a corps alignment. So, I think we have the regionalization piece about right. I think that piece works. And, as the LAO shop and the maneuver force falls into that area and

they plug into the LSE structure, that works. I think our big challenge here is continuing to refine how do we make it as unit-focused as possible, and I say unit from the standpoint of rounding out and filling up quickly here and rotating with that force as much as possible to maintain those habitual relationships. That's the challenge we face in terms of the LSEs.

EATON: That's the rotation challenge, then.

MCMANUS: That's the rotation piece.

EATON: And, I saw that a lot with the LARs on the ground saying, "Don't know any of these people, don't know this equipment." And they spent the first two, three weeks just figuring out the people you need to go see and equipment, and I saw one again a few weeks later, and he said everything was great, and he was going, but there were a lot of obstacles to jump over first. Luckily in a war zone, while I think those obstacles are there, we overcome them faster.

MCMANUS: They're there. And it raises a great point. In a combat zone, the issue of trust and confidence is absolutely paramount. I mean, it has to be immediately. You build it in a non-wartime environment here and get to it. So, I think that's the big issue. That was the issue of the continuity of effort here, the habitual relationships and knowing who was who. And, if we had to do it again, I'm not sure we have the flex to do it any differently, but we're smarter about how we do it now, perhaps. And I think that's the biggest lesson learned on how we fill against those TDAs and make things happen to support the force.

Phase II – Deployment

VOSS: Did you have to make any organizational or management or process changes, as we shifted into the deployment phase? Can you explain them?

MCMANUS: Good lord, yeah. The thing about the Operations Center and Ops Updates -- that was a battle lab, because each phase brought its own unique information requirements. So the answer is yes, we were continuing making revisions to information. We got really good at articulating what we call the CCIR, the Critical Commander Information Requirements. We had to go through and make sure it was still valid as things may be changing, and did it mandate a change in the CCIR. Then we also had to get into methodologies that were not so much the here and now. We had to be looking at predictive methodologies. What do we need to be doing to do this, say, at this timeline, versus, not the next couple of days, [but maybe] it could be months away. So, I think the biggest process change was, we had to learn to sometimes integrate tactical, operation, strategic, and decision making all within the same briefing chart. That was the learning curve for all of us, to include myself. I think the spirit of learning was always with us as we went through the difficult times, and we had to adapt to meet the changing information requirements by phase or by unit or by situation.

I keep going back to the Operations Center. The issue for us, [from the day I took command of] this organization was global logistics information dominance. We were talking one day, I was talking to the XO, and we were kind of reminiscing over some of the visions that I brought to the organization, and how a lot of this is just the experience. It could have been serendipitous, or flat, pure, dumb, unadulterated luck. But, in retrospect, we began on the right glide path at the right time. We just had to make some adjustments as the pace of operations stepped up. I think the other thing, we're always in a state of looking at process revisions, process improvements, changes, adds, deletes to what we're looking at here. Again, tethered to what the information requirements are for that phase of the operation or that specific event, whatever it may be, that we have to address from an AFSC and JMC perspective.

VOSS: Did deployment go as planned or as envisioned, or did we do things significantly different than what we had expected?

MCMANUS: We always say that what you execute bears little or no resemblance to what you plan for, and that kind of held true. In the case of outloading ammunition, I hadn't planned on snow and ice storms. I hadn't planned on going from snow and ice storms and sending things to Jackson, Florida, and that port having been shut down because of lightning storms. So, the environmental issues we had to deal with here were, of course, outside of our control. And here again, I think the mark of an organization is how does it respond to these types of issues. I think we did extraordinarily well, across the whole organization, from communications and communications backbone to processes, informational requirements, being able to boil down just tons of information for the commander who must act in a very precise period of time, to produce the outcome.

VOSS: How did we respond to the large number of ammunition requests?

MCMANUS: A big part of our ammunition mission, ammunition supply management, really kind of came into the forefront with the number of mobilizations. It used to be the old phrase was 'just in time' -- the delivery. For us, it was 'on-time', making sure these were shipping out because this was one of the biggest challenges we faced in terms of how we moved stocks around here to meet multiple simultaneous deployers. On the Field Support side the issue for us was, as we started getting into the mobilization piece and the deployment piece, "how do you maintain continuity of effort in the organization when your units are going for a year and you're rotating people in 179 days?" So, when your Unit A deploys with its AMC element, then they're going to be gone for a year. You rotate your people after 179 days, you tap into the personnel support structure for Unit B. Guess who now deploys? Unit B. So, how do you go back and fill those requirements? So, this is a big issue for us is in terms of the realities that we must deal with here to be a part of an organization. Organizations are going to deploy and could be deployed for upwards of a year. On the FSC side, this is one of the biggest challenges we've had to work through. We've also had issues with our emergency essential coded positions. I've said repeatedly, the "troops" of the command are: the few military, largely Department of Army civilians, and equally large number of contractors. For us to do our mission requires a huge sacrifice to support by folks like you who are willing to go off and do

these kinds of things. So, we learned a lot about how we had our positions structured and coded to be an operational type of military, and far more so than we thought it was going to require us to do.

VOSS: Did the MRR [Munitions Readiness Report] help us in the deployment phase, or is that more of a tool to tell DA the readiness status?

MCMANUS: Both. The issue of the MRR became one of today's status and tomorrow's readiness -- what was due in from production, due in from procurement. It became a great way to make decisions on how you apply resources and what you had to have today versus tomorrow, what could wait, and so forth. Again, it began on September the 14th and [we worked hard] to put this system in place back in January of 2002. I recall vividly going to the Pentagon once a quarter to brief the Chief of Staff of the Army on this. The answer is most definitely -- it was more than just a data point because you had to build budgets and POMs that allow you to address the issues over time, and that's the biggest issue. We're dealing with it right now. Our current Chief believes part of our responsibility is to make sure that time is the ally, not the enemy. So, the SRS [Strategic Readiness System—the MRR is part of the SRS] became an invaluable tool and gives us options that we hadn't thought about before. From that standpoint, yes, it got inculcated within the ethos of the organization, the management structure, both the Department of the Army and AMC and this command. As I said, it was invaluable to us all throughout the whole process. Even today we're using it to educate the New Army leadership.

VOSS: How did the deployment process illustrate the jointness of the JMC?

MCMANUS: Because every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine that's going to go in harm's way, we supply with some of the tools of the trade, then they go off and do their mission. The ammunition mission at the outset is the most joint mission, which drove us to make it the Joint Munitions Command. On the prepositioning side, on the Field Support side here, the joint lines are there, but not as clear-cut. Once you start going into deployed areas of operation we bring, as the land component, tremendous capabilities the other services can leverage from a common users support standpoint. So, we are part of the joint team from the joint support standpoint. And those relationships have also grown over time. Right now, we're evolving into a pretty active relationship with the Transportation Command. Actually our own logistics combatant commander today. As we work the distribution process, it would be a part of how they're going to handle that mission they've been given. So, we began joint, we have developed greater jointness, and now we're actually - - we went from just doing joint supply to being a key part of a joint logistics combatant commander's organization, working with them. So, I would say that we would get a go, if you will, on joint operations, joint logistics operations, and joint interaction.

VOSS: What other tools were developed to help JMC cope with the deployment process?

MCMANUS: We had a number [of tools]. Probably the biggest one we developed was called the Munitions COP, Common Operating Picture. We found there was an information void, and ammunition was so important to the arrival of the force, to getting it linked up.

And we ended up because of quantity-distance factors and just general safety issues -- we didn't ship it in all cases like the warfighter wanted it. Not because of anything we did or failed to do here, just the reality of how you packaged units to move them on the surface. We realized that you could burden the system with a lot of details, so we developed this COP, and every day as I was briefing this, we were actually tracking and sending this to the theater so it would facilitate decision making on the far end about what ships you brought it. Now, at the same time, we were sending this to all of our customers, so the customers knew what the status was so they'd have perfect visibility of their ammunition movement as part of their pre-deployment and deployment processes as well. So, that was one of the biggest ones that comes to mind right now that we actually developed to help bridge an information gap we saw within the flow of the forces and supplies.

VOSS: What kinds of actions did we execute in the logistics readiness integration mission during the deployment process?

MCMANUS: Well, being on point for AMC, the integration began by making sure that there are support ops who were linked to the readiness directorates of the commodity commands. And so, that bridge got built very effectively in deploying the force, and it's continued to evolve beyond just that now to forward repair activities and capability build-ups here that are responsive -- in response to issues raised by the tactical community in concert with the Field Support people.

VOSS: Was this a big difference from Phase I or just more of it, then?

MCMANUS: Just more of it. Remember now, this is kind of the issue when you look at phasing versus Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration [RSOI]. We were in several phases technically simultaneously. As you were doing a pre-mobilization for one, you were actually deploying another. As you were deploying this, you were actually receiving another. So, for us, the linkage ran several pathways, if you will. So, while the operations stuff would be gauged by phasing, we could be in several phases simultaneously because of the forces deploying at different time lines, different locations, different structures, different equipment requirements, and so forth.

VOSS: Are our LAOs and LARs equipped to do their mission?

MCMANUS: The short answer is they're better today than they were when they went, but it's not enough. The issue for us is the recognition of what it takes to equip our LSEs, our LAOs, our LARs, to be a viable part of each organization, which they are. But you've got to be self-contained in many respects. One of the great capabilities that we expanded upon in this period was the multimedia communication system, MMCS. It was a unique part of our communications fly-away package that we had to have. Now, we're still working the issues today with Stryker in terms of what do you have to have in terms of vehicle support... communication support... because in most cases what we're leveraging is information flow. And information flow gets translated into some action. It could be a repair part, technical assistance, bullets; so, the issue for us is just building upon this. We've learned a lot of lessons about what we think we need to have, and now the

challenge is to push the resources to get our equipment procured, in the hands of our folks here so they can train and be more proficient with their equipment.

VOSS: In 1991, a big lessons learned was that we had to give LAOs communication, life support, and transportation. It sounds like we had similar shortfalls this time.

MCMANUS: We did. The MMCS addressed some of the communications backbone. Our transportation is still a problem for us because -- we're much in the [same] line with the chaplains. Chaplains go into a unit, they had no vehicles, but a chaplain has got to be mobile to serve the organization. The AMC has to be mobile to serve the troops in the support unit structures. So, we make some inroads. We made some commercial procurements. We've done a lot of things to be reactive and responsive to our customer requirements. We're nowhere near the level we should be today, be it of either a technology or a rounding out the force, if you will. I mean, a good example today we're facing is arming LARs when they go out on convoys, just because of the tactical situation.

VOSS: How did MMCS come about, and what capability has it given us?

MCMANUS: Gosh, I think MMCS was an idea that was brought to us by the company, I think it's TAMSCO that produces it. But, that aside, I think it was a real simple matter to just build upon a capability that we know we needed to have here to link to the organic base. It actually filled a void -- there was nothing there. Everything went through wholesale systems primarily. This gave us a tactical/operational/strategic linking capability here. In fact some cases we found, when they had problems with units, they would come over and they could run their cycles in MMCS systems. So, it was another way we added value and some backup to those units we were supporting.

VOSS: LOGCAP has been in the news both negative and positive. Did LOGCAP do what it was supposed to do? Is it being overused?

MCMANUS: LOGCAP is a contingency instrument. LOGCAP did what it was supposed to do. That said, LOGCAP is grossly misunderstood by those not involved in it. When you go into a country like we did here, by design we lost structure and our combat service support says we'll use the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program, so, absolutely. KBR came in, and they had some learning curves too, because again, as we kind of got into it, no one expected it to grow as rapidly as it did. And that's been, I think, the biggest issue that we have faced is just how the units have grown to depend on it significantly. So, is it overused? No. You'll get different points of view on that. It's a contingency contracting instrument, and as such, you are paying for contingency capability. It's when you transition for contingency contracting to sustainment contracting, when do you have time to compete everything? So, no, it's not being overused. It's not fully understood in a lot of different areas by a lot of different organizations and people.

VOSS: We kind of touched on this a little bit, but what are the implications for LOGCAP and future contingencies.

MCMANUS: It will always be there. We have now gotten into a tremendous reliance on what the commercial sector can bring to bear for us. I mean, take a look at something like feeding the troops, providing base support, life support, shower facilities, latrine facilities, laundry service; all the things we used to have forestructure to do, we don't have it anymore. So, I think we've learned some tremendous lessons about how to do it -- provide it more rapidly than we have in the past. But for every conflict of any magnitude, LOGCAP is going to be an essential part of our ability to support the force.

VOSS: Is doctrine up to speed with how we have used LOGCAP and contractors on the battlefield?

MCMANUS: Yes and no. I think the piece we're dealing with right now on the contractors in the battlefield is when you have a threat, as we've faced today, it takes a lot of forestructure to secure your convoys. So, we actually are looking at is it practical to contract out security? And there are all kinds of legal issues when you look at doing that. That's a big one. From that perspective, we have to address that issue. The other one becomes Army (level, inaudible) -- not so much our contractors, but also our Department of Army civilians as well, for self protection. I would take it further than just contractors. It's civilians on the battlefield. Because today, what we're learning here is with LOGCAP and with our Department of Army civilians, we don't have a status of forces agreement with Iraq. So, their status is they are civilians accompanying the force. There will be more learning doctrinally about what we need to address as a result of this scenario we've actually been required to operate within, with regard to contractors and civilians on the battlefield.

VOSS: What kinds of actions did we execute in the APS mission area?

MCMANUS: Hand-off. You know, once you hand off your equipment, you become a pretty extensive maintenance and repair capability for the force. Today, we talk about reset, but we're actually doing repair/return to the theater, to our forces, because we have a tremendous capability within the region we can leverage to provide them back-up maintenance and supply support. Eventually, we'll get to reset. We've also generated some excesses. We're looking at how we can use that to meet other requirements that may come our way too. For APS, if the mission is to hand off, then get it done, and then prepare it for the next phase. Which is what we're doing today.

VOSS: We ended up doing administrative downloads of the prepo afloat ships. How was this different than expected? Do you think admin download is the future?

MCMANUS: Admin download is an essential to train the force. And I would not limit myself to admin downloads. We need to exercise preposition as part of our JCS directed exercise program. That's where the learning takes place. So, the admin downloads, if you take a look at what we do to -- we've done very small levels. You get some training.

You learn about organization. You have a chance to assess your download sites, your hand-off sites, and so forth. But, the biggest issue that's changed today on prepo, versus when prepo was directed as a program, is the issue of time. When we put prepo together, when I was the first commander at War Reserve Support Command, we made two basic assumptions in the program: one, that we would always offload in a relatively benign environment, and two, we'd have time for maintenance. And neither of those assumptions hold true today. So that's going to drive us to rethink how we do the preposition afloat program. Making the cycles, stow of equipment on a ship, and so forth, because you can never assume a benign environment here, and you can never assume time is on your side. So, both of the initial paradigms have been broken from inception of the program to what it is today. Today it really is a strategic, operational, tactical resource that must be capable of being employed literally overnight if the situation warrants. We have to be ready for it.

EATON: Sir, I want to follow up on a question Janette asked you about admin download of the prepo vessels. It wasn't quite what I thought we were going to talk about. Let me go back and clarify and make sure I'm on track. You said there were always two assumptions that we're going to have.

MCMANUS: Yeah. When the prepo program was initially envisioned, there were two key assumptions, and that drove how we structured the program at the time. The first is that it was envisioned that we'd only offload the equipment in what was termed a relatively benign environment, and two, there would be some maintenance time required and would be built from the plan. So we combined the benign environment here and the maintenance requirement. That drove several different policy decisions, not the least of which was the stow factor because we were going back -- I think at the time the number was 17 LMSRs to support the afloat program here that was based on an 80% stow factor. It wasn't built in. When I got here in the War Reserve Support Command, that's when we began looking at the issue of onboard maintenance crews, and we began parking vehicles with doors open or doors removed to facilitate the crawl space to go through to do checks and things like that. Even then it was limited. And the objective there was to gain as much maintenance visibility as possible so you could plan your download work still working against those initial planning assumptions. The fact is in the program today and the program of the future, those two assumptions no longer can apply, in my judgment.

EATON: I thought that the doctrine had always been though that the ship would pull up, benign environment, like it was in Kuwait. However, the using unit would be there on the docks basically helping to pull the stuff off.

MCMANUS: That's exactly right.

EATON: When I was asking about admin download, I was thinking of the fact that the troops weren't even there for most of this. And was that a real surprise to us that suddenly we had to bring in contractors to process a bunch of [equipment], and that's what I was trying to get at when I mentioned the word admin download.

MCMANUS: The whole planning scenario has changed because, when you look at the benign environment here -- I always envisioned at some point in time, we thought this would be part of RSO&I. We had these elaborate plan-o-graphs, unit parking areas, and so forth. You still had to require that when you had your supercargo and you had your hand-off team, all you had were enough people to work with the port authority to download the stuff, get the stuff parked, and then you began the hand-off piece. But we had not envisioned this large contractor operation and actually replacing units because of the RSO piece. The RSO piece is the piece we had to go back and refigure how prepo will play in RSO.

EATON: Do you see that sort of contractor download as the future, or, if we're going to go into less benign environments, do you think we're going to have to adjust back to the troops again?

MCMANUS: George, where I see this thing going here is almost like [considering] ambiguous versus unambiguous warning times. I think we may have to find that as we look to the future to structure prepo, we need to take into account that your load is going to define your offload and your employment. So, in this regard, if we take a look at some scenario, some lesser contingencies where there will be ambiguous warning times, I would configure that ship for rapid offload-rapid employment. You may only take maybe a battalion task force and do it that way here. I think the bulk is going to be based upon the model we saw unfold here with OIF, which was a large contractor presence required to facilitate that. Because as you get into it, [there's] one thing that we will never control, and that's the trigger point for crossing the line of departure, and we saw that in fault here within this last operation. The trigger point actually was delayed versus where I think the National Command Authority wanted it to be. In this whole process the issue becomes the generation of combat power, and that combat power is manned equipment and units to be able to go forth and do the mission. So, in this case, we can take a look at the 3ID, which is primarily prepo, and some home-stationed equipment here. We have to be flexible to go on both dimensions. And if we are going to a future scenario like SWA, I think we can tend to plan for a larger contractor requirement here. For example, we didn't do Liberia, but if we go and we looked at Liberia, I'd see they're a battalion task force with a loose stow. You can drive off the ramp.

EATON: Over the shore.

MCMANUS: Over the shore. Exactly right. And, you know what we got into when we actually went through some of the test on this when I had the War Reserve Support Command. We actually went through one cycle, and we had actually loaded fuel tankers. I mean, we put those in there to see how that was going to work too. Because the issue was having some sustainment when you got there you need to rapidly employ. Because even then, back in the '97, '98 time frame when I was here, we began to see the employment scenarios changing versus the planning scenarios against which the program was developed. So, I hope that gives you enough clarification.

EATON: I think so.

MCMANUS: I think what happened here is that the scenarios changed, and so we did what we do very well here. We reacted accordingly. Now, I think the key is, is taking the lessons learned here and seeing, "OK, will one size fit all, or do we have one or two ships for an ambiguous scenario here and the remainder for an unambiguous scenario like we saw here within the OIF.

VOSS: Were we structured to support the size and speed of prepo download and repositioning? If not, how did we adjust CEB-Kuwait and others?

MCMANUS: Well, that was my purpose of commenting about mobilization TDAs. Our TDA staffing levels were structured to meet the requirements of day-to-day operations. So, the issue for us was getting ramped up in sufficient time. When you go back and revisit ongoing manning levels in the program here and based on what we learned about ramp-up times when you go to a massive download operation here, do we have it right? We know we have some issues with our forward presence, emergency essential coding, things of that nature, so we can be responsive to the war fighter. And we're addressing those through a myriad of actions to make sure our structures improve and meet with the demands of what is a changing environment for downloading new stuff, all the preposition stocks.

VOSS: What kinds of war reserve and prepo actions came up that were surprises?

MCMANUS: Early on, there were probably a number of things that popped up but at the strategic level, I think the biggest thing we saw in OIF, probably around Phase IV -- is the structure of prepo and the demands of the battle space required some adjustment. We started bringing up armored Humvees. We began changing the very structure of these units that we built because the battle space itself had different demands. You're looking for mobility, looking for protection, and so forth. So, that was the biggest thing, I think, that change we had to adjust to midstream. And, that is what we had envisioned, quite frankly. It's certainly not a criticism on anything we did or failed to do here. I think we responded responsibly and responsively in relatively short periods of times to meet the requirements. Now, of course, if you want something today, you won't get it today -- you know, you have a problem with that. But, again, I think all things considered, this command did yeoman's work in responding to the requirements of the theater, and many of the requirements were changed overnight to employ the force and protect the force and allow the force to operate in this environment.

VOSS: In January of this year, 2003, Brigadier General Boles and a large number of employees departed to expand AMC SWA in theater. Was this expected as part of the doctrine?

MCMANUS: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. That was a good part of the plan. Now, we've got to re-look this, OK, because when we had the War Reserve Support Command as a BG, we felt like that was a potential. The part of our evolution, to be part and together with the theater support commands and the FSC will require us to address this in the future in a different way. But, yes, that was always part of our plan. If we had to go back, we had to

download the program here at the APS, and we had to ramp up the LSE to Brigadier. It was always envisioned the BG associate with Field Support Command would be called forward to do that. And, we executed the plan.

VOSS: What kinds of personnel issues did this operation raise? Can you fix some of them -- pay, overtime, length of tour....?

MCMANUS: Well, the first thing is that I've talked about here, we may have the balance of full time versus mobilization positions out of whack. The other thing I've learned is when you go into the battle space, the issue of the pay allowance limitations came up. Between overtime and so forth by law there are limits on what you can pay people during the course of an employed year. That kind of drove us, how we were going to redeploy and replace people. And, these were pay cap limitations we faced. They weren't insurmountable, but it drove us to look at how we managed our personnel. Right here today we're looking at this in terms of what's the right composition, the right mix, how much forward, how much call forward, and how much emergency essential -- and how much by different skill types, skill sets we need to have as part of the structure.

VOSS: Now, there were several people that were retired and they were called back to help in this process. That was driven by lack of skills?

MCMANUS: Short of skills, yes. The fact is they had a tremendous amount of knowledge that we needed. Our learning curve was very short. So, once again we looked at all the resources that we could tap into, and that ran the gamut of the total command. It was AFSC and JMC, both organizations that we did that. We hired annuitants, callbacks, consultants -- whatever mechanism we could use to bring our skill sets back in, and fill a void. We did what we had to do here so that we could accomplish the mission.

VOSS: How did you manage both commands with the FSC CG deployed? What did you do different? Is this important for future operations?

MCMANUS: (chuckles) Oh, boy, that's a great question. I'm going to go back and be somewhat repetitious. I believed that how we began in terms of critical commander information requirements, battle rhythm, structured composition, the operations center, continuous global information connectivity with our field elements here -- those were indispensable to me. The issue for me was allocating time... because, while my BG was deployed, I was required to go and visit now two organizations versus one. On top of that, the demands placed on me as the MSC Commander were more extreme than those placed on a subordinate command. So, the issue for me was balancing time, which is why we had to mobilize my DCG to give me some relief. We're going to go back and do the same thing now with General Radin's deployment. I'm going to remobilize General Rafferty for a period of six months -- and we learned the first time what you had to have. It really takes two general officers, given the global nature of this command and the fact you're always in an engagement with some combatant commander in a different region of the world here.

So, other than just the issue of the amount of workload here, which is not the issue -- the issue is just having information -- the issue wasn't briefing for the sake of briefing. The issue was briefing what was important to the issue -- getting the staff disciplined to know when to bring things to the CG. That was the biggest thing we had to learn is, when do things require CG decisions, CG information? Can it wait for two weeks? Can it wait for a day? Can it wait for an hour? So, a lot of our time was spent teaching people the time-sensitive nature of decisions. And, once we got into that here, it just became a matter of how we should interact in these sessions. If you went back and looked, most of our ops update sessions were training sessions. Because we were training as we were operating at the same time here. Again, this is an extensive organization, very complicated with support tentacles everywhere almost, it seems like. So, the good news for me was, I had negotiated to some degree a learning curve. Coming in, in the middle of the operation would have been not impossible but would have been pretty doggone difficult in terms of trying to assimilate because we don't have a system of training officers to be ammunition generals. And then for us, the dynamic of the prepositioned stock program and the field assistance program, some of the key billets we bring to the table here and it became so critical in the execution of this operation, even more so than Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

A lot of this is just goes into a day in the life of a CG from that standpoint. But hopefully, as issues came up, we tried to put fixes in place systemically to address the things that came up here. I mean, even today I lay down, I think, it's six or seven topics at every ops update that they must address. They are the big issues on our plate today. I sent this list out. It was covered the other day here. It serves as a reminder; it kind of sets the tone for the staff of all the things they [have] got to be looking for. So, these are all the things that we and the ops update must address. If I'm doing my job here, I can help the staff. The staff will depend on me to kind of-- not so much be a crystal ball reader, but to use my judgment and experience to know what's going to be the next critical gate we're going to have to pass through. Anticipation is-- rightfully so-- is one of the first tenets of our logistics doctrine, and we practice that here in this organization. A lot of it is just kind of anticipating what's going to be required next before it pops up, and I think the command's gotten very good at that.

End of Major General McManus Interview - Part One

12/29/2003 Interview: Major General McManus - Part Two

Phase III – Decisive Operations

EATON: It is 29 December 2003. General McManus and George Eaton in his office, and following up on the oral history interviews. [Two sets of questions on APS download and LSE TDAs were moved to better locations earlier in this transcript.]

So, let's jump into Phase III, Decisive Operations. Decisive Operations began in late March. This was not a linear phase by phase by phase operation. Do you think that most of our work was done as far as getting the stuff on the ground when [combat] kicked off,

or how much more did we have to go?

MCMANUS: George, let me tell you-I go back again. We used this phrase. I think I've used it in the interviews here. Remember now, you're talking about linear and non-linear. The fact is, we have a non-contiguous battle space. Now, put that aside for a second. The technical support that AMC typically does because we have untold experience with that regard with phases, OK, the technical support, the sustainment piece, the building up, the capability piece, the FRA (Forward Repair Activity), if you will. Those are things we're very good at here. The biggest piece I think we could take into account, and we're still working that today here, has more to do with contract and logistics support, LOGCAP, if you will.

The biggest challenge we face right now is -- I learned this in the Balkans, I've talked with some guys who were there -- we're going to fully leverage contract and logistics support-- that's going to be the way of this operation, it will be the way of the future. The biggest piece we had to deal with was, when we got into Phase III, Decisive Ops, and once you got to a certain point in the Decisive Ops phase, the world at large saw -- and this is the wrong word here, but I'll use it -- they saw more of a normalization of activity--even though you're still in a hostile environment here, you are not on the offensive, per se. Now you're in a condition setting, [where you] cannot peak, but you kind of cross the threshold. This is the piece that got us and I saw emerging in this operation, and I still see it today. Once the leadership, not in the theater of operation, begins to see the sustaining phase -- what we would typically get to is the Phase IVs, Vs and VIs of operations. What I saw unfold is a changing mindset between LOGCAP as a contingency-based contracted logistics support capability here, then going into the issue of cost control, requirements suppression, its just like literally overnight. It came about and I realized we were in this phase when I was going into close-out this last year when some of the major units were looking at deobligating money in LOGCAP because of their funding programs. I realized at that time we had to go back in the operation from a deliberate planning perspective, and as we build the phases, we need to build in at least a target point for transitioning from contingency contracting to sustainment contracting. You saw this on your time on the ground there. At some point in time, the auditors begin to appear. And there's nothing wrong with that, I'm just saying that you need to take a look at this, and then what's happening here. It's easy to organize an audit crew or review crew to come and look at this. It is not as easy -- the time dimension is the enemy here in terms of what it takes now to convert from contingency to sustainment contracting because now you have the competition time lines. There's a process you go through, some you can do more quickly, but that's the piece right now that's working through because as you move ahead, there's going to be a greater reliance on contracting logistics support, and that's the piece we've got to organize and equip for, for the operation.

To recap, the missions we normally do, I think we got the right balance. We also saw in the case of our LSEs, we aren't even into reset yet. We're still into GWOT, if you will, because most of the work being done, as you saw in Arifjan, is not to reset the APS force, it's to sustain the employed force. And, so, I think that's the other dimension we had that we should have factored in is the viability of reset time lines, the reconstitution

timelines for APS, because that is way down the line. It may not be a Phase III; it may be a Phase V or VI type of event because your capability is being utilized to sustain the deployed force. And then, George, as we go through TOA here in this part of next year, now we have another learning curve to negotiate. Will there be a dip in running this because of new units, new environments, because some will deploy their own equipment here? We've understood right now that a big part of our core capability goes from the preposition stock to providing a theater capability. So, that's kind of normalized, if you will, but the LOGCAP piece, we're still working through that.

EATON: And what they call Phase III, was really only about five weeks long. Late March to 1 May.

MCMANUS: That's exactly right.

EATON: As we already mentioned everyone wants to see clean phases, we prepped, we did this, we fought, then we did that. But AMC was continuous. We were pushing the 4th ID forward, arming them, while the fight was going on up forward. So, it was...

MCMANUS: George, one thing you could say, you've got a Phase III for this 3ID, a Phase III for the 4th Division, a Phase III for a different thing. All of the guys that are out watching the combat plan, the theater campaign plan, but each with its own scope because of the non-linearity of the battlefield.

EATON: That's where you need the old horse blanket.

MCMANUS: You're right. So, that's where the flexibility and the adaptability became key attributes of the AMC force to be able to deal with these things.

EATON: This is going to sound like a bad question, but it's not. Does AMC have a mission to the combat troops when the combat's going on and it only lasts for five weeks? And the reason I say this is, on day five of the combat operation, 3ID could call back and ask for a widget for a tank, and we could never get it to him on time. So, does AMC really have a role in a short duration, high-intensity combat, or is our role to be looking forward into the next phase?

MCMANUS: That's the issue. When you take a look at the tactical, operational, strategic realms of operations, there is very little that AMC can do to influence the tactical fight. About the only thing it can do, through either assemblies or repair parts provisioning, is being a pull through something in the clutch. It's almost like using the NTC [National Training Center, Ft. Irwin, CA] model. When you cross the line of departure, I mean, how much can you have in the fight? Now, where AMC does have a role to play your tactical realm here is making sure we keep things moving, or at least making available those things that need to be made available to support the force. But the bigger mission for AMC is looking at the next phase because now, as you go from Phase III to Phase IV it's like all the operations we've trained for. Once you complete your Phase III, now you've got to consolidate, redistribute ammunitions, regroup, reconstitute. All these

things we should be thinking about in terms of how are we marshaling and prepositioning the capability here so we can help reset the force in theater for the next big operation, should you require. You take the classic combat operations, you should do this, how much time you have before the counterattack. Again, on an operational, strategic level here, that's where I think AMC's value to the battle space really comes in. You're hamstrung when a division's on the move to do much other than just roadside repair, miracle work, "jury-rigging," whatever it's going to be to keep as many vehicles in the fight as possible. That's about the extent of what we can do.

EATON: The 3ID, the 173rd, and those other LSEs that were actually in that major combat period, were they able to get back information so that we could do our horizontal integration thing?

MCMANUS: Remember now, when you take a look at the LSEs, we had the MMCS system. All right. Now you got to be immobile and set up with a backbone here if we're going to communicate. What we were able to do is, we could actually go in through the satellite network versus the network the maneuver units had here to blast things. Because then, you may recall, they were actually using the MMCS to blast back to theater because they could not get their organic comms to work. So, in that regard, that's a new mission that gives us some redundancy. The real first casualty was logistics reporting because we saw, unlike we've seen in our training programs here, we saw a speed unlike anything we had anticipated. So, with that, we were trying to do the classic logistics reporting and the classic battle analysis with the strategic element and so forth, and we were just incapable of doing it. One example that popped up was this thirst for how much ammunition was consumed. We were actually reporting and the theater was reporting and I was tied into the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] and seeing what was briefed in the terms of rounds consumed. So, the thirst for information went up exponentially, and the ability to provide it went down equally exponentially.

EATON: [Because] we didn't get LOG SITREP reporting during the combat phase, and the reset phase, that's caused the APS guys some problems. TACOM came in and said, "Wait a minute. Before you can reset these tanks, we've got to know how many rounds so we can document how much tube life is left." And, so, they would make all the crews in 3ID document how many rounds they had fired. The APS guys watched them sit down on the ground and scratch their heads and go, "let's write this number down," because they had no idea. They hadn't kept count, which is amazing because downstairs I have some papers from the old Sheridan program. The Sheridan had a built-in counter on it. Every time it fired, it somehow counted that a round had gone down range.

MCMANUS: I didn't realize that. See, the issue for me is we need to push the technology that has a chip built in based on the rate of fires that feeds someone's reporting system. The speed of the battle space, we saw this unfold in Iraq here, is that it necessitates technological solutions to what has been manual or input reporting, fingers to keyboards, and so forth. And it's got to be a different way because just the speed of the battlefield and so forth, the thirst for information is ten times faster than the actual ability for the theater to produce it. I mean, this is classic. Everybody wants to know exactly what's

going on, and even in your own realm, you want to know exactly what your status is in the realm you're responsible for. Well, technology has got to solve that because you can't sit just like me doing email here. The expectation, you send me this email, I'm sitting at my desk waiting for an email to give you your response right back. The reality is it may be a day, it could be two, it could be three. And that's what I saw unfold in the logistics reporting piece here. Technology has got to solve this for us because we can no longer rely on manual reporting or input devices to do that kind of stuff.

EATON: At least you put in on the on-board computer so that you can track it later on.

MCMANUS: Right.

EATON: Do you think this leads us back to more of the old-style push and iron mountains? I'm not allowed to say that, but more that we'll make the push, and if it's too much, the combat commander leaves it behind?

MCMANUS: You've almost got to rethink this issue of our sustainment stockpiles. What does it consist of, where should it be located. You're exactly right, George. The issue is, we're here now, and we've got to be fair to ourselves, too. If you go back to take a look at your previous operations, no one ever expected us to consume a year's worth of OPTEMPO in one month of operation. So, the best thing we could do now is go back to the data collection program here and take a look at this, and then leverage that information as we do deliberate planning. I think from that standpoint we picked up tremendous amounts of useful logistics intelligence to go back at how we would rethink and plan what should be forward so you're able to, I won't so much say push, but to respond forward versus respond from the rear. And that's what we lost. There's also an industrial base piece of this we saw unfold, too. This has to be factored into our industrial base planning here to be able to meet any surges beyond what this operation gave us useful insight into. And now we're capitalizing upon it in terms of our resourcing and our programming. I hope we're going to benefit from this in ammunition, for sure.

EATON: Stock turnover, at least.

MCMANUS: Exactly right. Exactly right.

EATON: If you wipe out all the old stocks, at least you'll have new stuff when you replace it.

MCMANUS: Exactly.

Phase IV and The Way Ahead

EATON: I'm just kind of wondering if maybe this long Phase IV we've been in has kept us busy, and we're still pushing vehicles north, we're still doing all this stuff. If this hasn't actually been good for AMC -- AFSC for sure -- because no one's yet come down and said this is how reset's going to look. We've actually had time to think about it. We

could have already reset our ammunition, but we haven't been able to because it's being used, but now the Division gets more time to think about where to position our stocks, where the sustainment base should be.

MCMANUS: Let's start with ammunition, OK? As units turn in and we begin to look at what we're going to retrograde, the theater has priority use. So, because the two ASPs are co-located, the theater ASP and our stockage point, we can maintain it and put it back into theater stock here. What's being retrograded is really what is above and beyond the theater forecasted requirements to support its future operations. So, that's working pretty well quite frankly. In fact, you can use that same model. The "did we have the ammunition piece about right?" I'd say we had it about right in terms of deliberate planning here. And we used some of that, and this is where our SRS system paid off in working with the theater in terms of doing some calculations for them and then getting some stock over there. We could do the same on the supply planning for other things as we mentioned in the last question in terms of using the data collection plan. But the answer is, this has been a resounding success for AMC in taking a look -- OK, where really are we? Where are we in this logistics battle space? That's what I see unfolding right now in the theater here. And, we've got to educate people because the people that are in that region today understand AMC. If you go to Korea, they won't understand AMC because all they see is the AMC they deal with and they may have dealt with in the past. So, our challenge is going to be taking this and operating that way over a recurring basis.

EATON: See, that's one thing that I want to do. I've got an article in my head -- right now we should be making the point hard of -- AMC is not is not your daddy's AMC. When you've got CEB Livorno, doing 10/20 level maintenance to get the 173rd out on time, and you got all these other things that we're doing, they're doing tactical level work, they're doing operational level work, they're doing strategic level work all across. And you're right. I think people in SWA understand that now as they're asking for another Humvee service center or HET service center, or this or that. But, you're right, the people, the rest of the globe has got to be educated still.

MCMANUS: They've got to be educated because they'll be hostages in their own theaters, and that's the problem.

EATON: Or else wait for the entire Army to rotate through SWA.

MCMANUS: [Laugh] Go back. We had to put together a chart that did this, George, and I haven't even seen this [yet]. It shows the transforming AMC. Let me show this one because I've used this over in Korea, and we'll use it in Europe when I go over next week. But it kind of reinforces how the AMC is changing. We've got the chart here because we had a hard time getting this message out, and the G7 guys have got this chart. If you take a look at this, the top piece I used to brief when I ran the LOG transformation for a period of time here, and that's how we change from CSS to maneuver sustainment. Well, AMC used to be wholesale/industrial base focused, and there we are the tactical operator of strategic logistics. In each of these examples here, the issues no longer react.

We have to anticipate and integrate and respond in a very timely fashion. That's where our tactical battle space issue comes in. Had we had the right data planning effort, we didn't have the right data to begin with to be sure, but we would anticipate. This was when the CG [AMC] was beating us up. We should have anticipated the increases in road wheels, rotor arms, and things of that nature.

So, the problem on the reactive side here is that you have this thing called the Atlantic Ocean you must negotiate to get there. We look at supply based versus rapid distribution based sustainment. What that means is, you may have to take a look at where you have your stockpiles located so some might be forwarded in extension of the theater. The other thing that we've seen no longer is AMC Army-centric. We are joint and coalition focused. When you take a look through LOGCAP, if nothing else, what we're doing is supporting the coalition force. But you look at logistics systems going to a collaborative environment, we've got to operate in a joint collaborative environment. We're working with JFCOM [Joint Forces Command] today to do that using ammunition SRS as a way of doing it here. And the planning centric -- see AMC used to be a big planning force. We're into execution, execution, execution.

EATON: On the run.

MCMANUS: Exactly. And, George, backtrack, this is execution on the fly. And that's what we've got to be able to do here. Industrial operations to joint theater logistics focused. In fact, what we have to do here is we have to leverage the lessons we're learning in that tactical operations strategic realm to shape the industrial base. And that is not commonly understood where you sit on the OSD and DA levels here. It used to be we were process driven, and we've got to break that paradigm to be effective and focused. This is like, "Gee, I didn't requisition something." Well, you know, that goes back to the point that we had to anticipate those kind of things. We were talking the other day here, if you went back just two predecessors of mine, and brought a person in here they would have no view of this command, because it has dramatically changed. I mean something that's simple but it's been so dramatic is, you remember, George, I came in with the theory of logistics information dominance, and you can't dominate logistics information when you shut down at 5:00, you can't communicate. The operations center concept, while it's been a hard cultural barrier for us to overcome here, has been a cornerstone to the success of this command and AMC in terms of how we network within the command's capability.

EATON: I mentioned this to you once before, that this was where we needed to go. We were almost lucky that this happened when it did because the things that you started putting in place-- all of a sudden the whip got cracked on them and you can overcome a lot of resistance when you have to execute.

MCMANUS: I was talking to the XO one day about this here. He said this is pure vision, I said, no, this is called pure dumb luck. The fact is I knew we had to change. I had my views on how we should change, and so I began the issue of this global information dominance approach, how we organize. Understanding that the Army in the field is in joint forces, I knew at some point in time we were going to be tested. I didn't realize that

we'd be tested so soon, and I think it underscores your point, George. All it did was validate we were on the right path, and what it made us realize here was this is how we must deal in this environment to prepare ourselves to support the force for the future.

We still have a lot of hurdles to overcome, mind you. We're still working on the ammunition side. We're still continuing to work with the PEO and PMs. We still have a lot of work to do in the LOGCAP here. We still have a lot of work yet with the integrating of the TSCs, and I think in that last point the current operation is going to give us as much insight as anything else in terms of how we need to be integrating. Another chart we have here is this global reachback that AMC provides, there's no TSC in the world today that can do what it needs to do to support the forces that come in the theater. And I can appreciate the view of the combatant commander and the command and control systems, being in charge. But what I can't understand and where I have difficulty today, at least one of the theaters, is the inability to look at this battle space, which is a battle for all intents and purposes today, and then rethinking how this global log piece needs to unfold in the future. I think in time with the focus here as the Chief of Staff [of the Army] is working and I think some of the things we're picking up here and over in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think it's going to help. We'll be making some further modifications. But what I feel good about, George, is I think from a culture standpoint is this command understands the culture that we're in and how we have to operate, both on the ammunition side and on the field support side as well. So I feel very good about that.

Lessons Learned

EATON: You've talked about several lessons learned. What are the hottest lessons learned from the deployment phase through the end of combat operations, through 1 May?

MCMANUS: I'll go back and I'm going to repeat myself a bit. The biggest lesson learned here was how to plan for not only the contract and logistics support, but how to crank in more rapidly the coalition support piece. I think the other thing here we've learned is -- and I haven't discussed this much in this interview here, is we've taken on centralized ammunition management [CAM]. We've got to take the lessons learned from there in terms of how we can better support the total force under CAM and then we're working that piece now, that thing has unfolded nicely, working with the theater.

EATON: You talked a little bit earlier about the tiering wasn't right and this led to CAM.

MCMANUS: And now the issue is, we've got to really operationalize that here at the headquarters. The emerging focus that we're getting into now, George, is that we're partnering with TRANSCOM on this deployment distribution operations center, so we are participants now, and we are going to test ammunition. But what we're getting into now is one of the things here in terms of going from a supply base to distribution focus. If you take a look at all the things that AMC brings to the battle space, it's kind of a no-brainer to think we have to be in line with TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] as a distribution process owner because the bulk of the force is going to be ground-centric but not ground-exclusive. And so we have to be involved with them for the commodities

that we're responsible for ourselves. So those are the kinds of big ones.

I guess that the last thing that is a big lesson learned, and this goes across the whole spectrum, is we really have to go back to something you started before here, terming Army 101, Military 101,* we really have to spend time training our civilians on military or operational art and what it means to us from a logistics planning perspective. I've watched our crew in the ops center, I would rank them against any other ops center, these guys have really come into their own here. But that's got to be permeated more throughout the command and so that's the piece we have to take on now. How do we leverage this from the learning standpoint here and crank it into the delivery training program so people understand what this means to us? But again what it's causing us to do, and we're doing it reasonably well here, is we are transforming, despite any formal transformation concepts or planners. I think we have to do it, because we are a responsive organization, and we're very flexible and adaptable and so the issue is to get all these changes institutionalized and documented because the next time we'll start where we end up this time here and so we've got to make sure we got it right.

EATON: We learned all kinds of logistics lessons in 1991 [Desert Shield/Desert Storm] that we never implemented. Do you have faith in the lessons learned process that we actually do learn and fix these things?

MCMANUS: I think what happens, George, is when it's a process we have to go through it, we have to do it. But a lot of things change in a decade, from '91, the first time we did this. We always go back and criticize ourselves, we say we learned nothing ten years ago. That's not a true statement. We learned a lot, and we did learn a lot here. I think what we end up doing here is we tend to grade our paper on what we didn't do and don't focus appropriately on what we did do from a lessons learned perspective. There are certain realities. Let me give you a good example, a lesson learned, from ten years ago. Desert DCUs, desert camouflage, and I had this discussion with the director of DLA recently. I said you know if you look at the battle space and we're working today with all of our operations here, everything we're planning for today could be fought in an environment where you're going to have a brown environment, not green, all right. Even Korea, most likely we're going to do anything, it's not going to be in the peak season because that impacts trafficability. And so I said why don't we make the DCU the standard uniform here. So the industrial base can catch up with us. We didn't learn anything in that regard. Was that an issue that was not a lesson learned here or was it a resource constraint, and so somewhere in the process you got to figure out OK, where are there resource constraints to lessons learned.

But there are some doozies out there, you saw in the paper, on the TV stations, some rumors about not equipping our soldiers with the best body armor. It's the reality of what it takes to produce body armor and where it fits in the resourcing priority. One would

* MG McManus is referring to a course designed and taught by Mr. Eaton beginning in 2000. Called "Military Fundamentals for DA Civilians," the 8-hour course covered the structure of DoD and DA, values, military rank, tactical unit structure, deployment considerations, and logistics preparation of the battlefield. Over 700 employees at Rock Island took the course.

think that ought to be your highest priority. Well, go back and ask anyone today if they thought we were going to be fighting a low-intensity or insurgent or counter-insurgent battle, and I say probably not. So again, we need to recognize there are lots of things we did do from a reactive standpoint. But a lot of these are resource-dependent issues, solutions and so forth. I think when we went back and we looked at what we did do as a result here, I think the success would amaze us in terms of what we did do, in terms of the positive change.

EATON: With our LAOs, just the fact we had MMCS, one of the biggest complaints of last time was no communication ability, so we fixed that. We didn't fix the vehicle issue but we're fixing that now. The other big one that I saw from being in theater because it's still not right, was that in '90 or '91, we pushed all kinds of cargo into theater before we pushed any troops in to handle it, and we did the same thing here and that's why the theater distribution center's been a thorn in our side since we started this thing.

MCMANUS: We've been unfairly critical of the distribution process and not taking that into account. See, what you find here is every element of the distribution process trying to be responsive. They start pushing things in there. Push, push, push, the issue is, "Can I receive?" We're going to learn a lot of things and if we can fix these things in terms of transmodal operations, OK. When you go into the example I used, if you go into an aerial port and it's pallet backlogged, you can reduce pallet backlog by combining pallets. But the problem is when you combine pallets, when you get the same level of visibility on the other end here, does that pallet fit your distribution plan and immediate realities in the deployed battle space? The answer is no to both questions. So when you look at this, there are some things we can't fix but it's going to be balancing the immediate. We want instant gratification, instant responsiveness, instant solutions, in this dimension, and so maybe we have to take half a step to be able to do that here, until we get into some rhythm, if you will.

EATON: I was trying to tell somebody over there that you can't just blame DLA, you have to understand DLA's metrics. What's their metric for pushing stuff out of New Cumberland, time? So multipack, and put it out. So the Army, someone needs to say, "Hey change your metric to receivability on the far end and then spend another couple of days filling a full pallet for a single unit and push it through." And they haven't really thought about that, they just wanted to blame DLA for sending multipack.

MCMANUS: Yeah, yes. We also learned in this process where distribution can bring you to your knees is when units keep moving. So in the early phases of an operation, you need to accept there may be some slow response because of movements, but once you start getting stabilized here, it should be packed for throughput to the consuming location.

EATON: We've talked about that for years and we still didn't quite get it because we moved too fast.

MCMANUS: We moved too fast. And then we began to rethink we need to take into account here we've got to let the footprint set. But some things we know are no-brainers. We'll

know where some muscle movements won't change things, where some could change. So we just could build this into the process but throughout the whole thing here, isn't it amazing, despite the problems here the one strength that we always could rely on was our responsiveness, our flexibility, our adaptability. We can solve problems. We'd like to solve them quicker, but we get reasonably timely solutions. I don't recall a single instance where a logistics failure introduced or was responsible for a mission failure.

EATON: That's one of the things that I saw at LSE SWA and I think also at LSE Iraq. I think that those two organizations are doing missions that they should not be doing. But people keep bringing them questions because they know that those two organizations are reacting and when they get a problem they're trying to find a way to fix it. So we're doing things now we shouldn't do because there's a whole theater structure who should do those things.

MCMANUS: However, let me give you the glass half full approach to that versus the glass half empty. We need to be capturing these things and showing why the value of the AFSC really is in deployed battle space with TSCs in that dimension because we should rightfully have a bigger picture view of this instead of TSC. So I think this is where we need to catch this and leverage this in terms of how we integrate the capabilities in the theater of operation. Are we doing things we shouldn't be doing? Yeah. But you know what, there's not a single command we put on the ground that's going to say no, because it involves supporting the troops. And it would be immoral to do so. I was talking to General Radin on this, about captured enemy ammunition. Should that be a JMC mission versus a Corps of Engineers mission? Well, as you move down the path here, one could say maybe that's a mission we should be doing, and so you organize around that. The challenge we face at AMC is we may not get any resourcing, we may have to apply existing resources against new missions and uncover things we truly should have been doing or should not do, and get on with the things we should be doing. So maybe the issue, George, is not so much what we shouldn't be doing, maybe the issue is maybe that's what we should have been doing, but there's something else we should not have been doing to make us more relevant in the battle space. That's a real theoretical answer, but a lot of this we're learning on the fly as we go.

EATON: As you said before, the big AMC has always been a process-driven thing, but right now it is one of the smallest organizations in the battlefield. And so when they bring in something there's not a bureaucracy to go through to get an answer. There's five or six people who put their heads together, come up with a solution set, and give it back to you again. So it's fast now, which is a really turnaround for AMC, who has a reputation as always so ponderous and slow, is that they don't have a big structure to go through to get an answer.

MCMANUS: And I've changed my mind on this over time too. I used to have difficulty with everybody tying into the AMC OPS Intel updates by telephone here, but quite frankly that has nothing to do with the command and control process. It has everything to do with the flow of information because the CG of AMC can direct things that I can't and still be executed through the command and control process, but in this regard we're

cutting through layers of bureaucracy just by how we operate. And I think it's going to make a difference for us in the long run.

EATON: I thought that was what horizontal integration was supposed to do. So maybe it's working the way we thought it would.

MCMANUS: That is exactly right. I think what this has really become for us, is I think this has been an opportunity for AMC to come into its own in this new dimension we have to operate within here. And it's a change, there's no doubt about that, I think we're responding well. Are we perfect? No, but we're responding extremely well in this whole process.

EATON: Anything else you'd like to add, sir?

MCMANUS: No, I think that's it now.

End of Interview: Major General McManus - Part Two

AMSFS-HI

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AFSC COMMAND HISTORIAN

SUBJECT: Access to Oral History Materials

1. I, Major General Wade H. McManus, Jr., participated in oral history interviews conducted by Janette Voss and George Eaton, for the AFSC/JMC History Office, on 15 and 29 December 2003, respectively.
2. I understand that the tape(s) and the transcript resulting from this interview will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the U.S. Army as determined by the AFSC Command Historian, AMC Command Historian, Center for Military History, or Center for Army Lessons Learned. I also understand that, subject to classification restrictions, I have been given an opportunity to edit the resulting transcript in order to clarify and expand my original thoughts. The AFSC/JMC Command Historian will provide me copies of the edited transcript for my own use subject to classification restrictions.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the tape and transcript to the AFSC and other Army History offices with only the following caveat: (Please initial one)




None

Other _____

4. I understand that the recording and transcript resulting from the interview may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army Field Support Command and Joint Munitions Command will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested be placed on these materials.


(Signature of Interviewee)


(Date)

Accepted on

Behalf of AFSC/JMC by: 

on 24 Feb 2004

