US Army Joint Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management Command
US Army Joint Munitions Command

END OF TOUR INTERVIEW

SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE MEMBER
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DEPUTY TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL
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ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM - END OF TOUR INTERVIEW
SES, Mr. Jyuji Hewitt

PLEASANT: Today is 26 June 2013 and this is Keri Pleasant interviewing Mr. Jyuji Hewitt, who is a Senior Executive Service member, currently transitioning to Research and Development Command from being the Deputy to the Commander here at Joint Munitions Command (JMC). I'll ask him a series of questions to gain his experiences and perspective on his tour at JMC.

You have been in the ammunition business with JMC/AMC for a long time. You were a Commander at Iowa and McAlester Army Ammunition Plants, you were the JMC Chief of Staff, and then became the Deputy Commander as a civilian Senior Executive Service member, and also led the command as Executive Director in absence of Commanding Generals. You've experienced the gamut of what we've been through over the course of the War. What were the priorities that shaped your approach or goals for the command as Deputy?

HEWITT: Primarily, civilians and the Deputy provide stability and continuity of the mission for the organization. As we had a rotation of General Officers, I felt my role was to be the experience and expertise of what the mission entails to provide the ammunition to the Warfighter. In our military today, the General Officers are not going to get the experiences of running an ammunition plant or depot. They are going to come in primarily as logistics officers. I'm providing the ammunition industrial base expertise to this business.

PLEASANT: What have you viewed as your most essential role as Deputy to the Commander?

HEWITT: It is the advisory role, but it's also understanding the bigger picture of the Army Materiel Command and Department of the Army. Understanding what's being authorized and appropriated from Congress, applying those strategic pieces and articulating that to the Commanding General. I think it's important for the Deputy to be that advisor, but understand that the leader of the command is still the Commanding General and the voice for the command. We have to help him or her understand the broader context of how JMC fits in with the Army Materiel Command (AMC).

PLEASANT: What significant initiatives were executed under your leadership that were key to the successful operation of the JMC mission?

HEWITT: Going further back, we actually stood up the Joint Munitions Command. JMC was a subordinate of the Army Field Support Command. General Benjamin Griffin, Commanding General for the Army Materiel Command, said he wanted a Joint Munitions Life Cycle Management Command. He charged Brigadier General James Rogers and myself to help get this going. General Rogers took me out of the Deputy position and put Mr. Bob Crawford to serve as the Deputy. I was assigned as the Chief of Staff, because I was previously the Deputy Chief of Staff at AMC and I understood staff operations to help put this command together. That was goal number one, and then we started synchronizing the relationships with Program Executive Office- Ammunition (PEO Ammo) and Armament Research Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) out at Picatinny, so that we were able to form a confederation for the life cycle management command.

While that was ongoing, and the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) activities also took place, and we had to close Riverbank, Kansas, Mississippi, Lone Star Army Ammunition Plants (AAPs), and Red River Munitions Center. At the same time, AMC was also dealing with the closure of Fort Monmouth and the movement of Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, in addition to their own headquarters movement. But in terms of the number changes we had to accomplish, we were in charge of a significant portion of the BRAC mission linked to AMC. Managing the process to accomplish all the BRAC actions was significant. We were also supporting the War by shipping ammunition to Iraq, and some ammunition to Afghanistan, while executing BRAC as a relatively new command, all at the same time.

We also implemented the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP), which was a new enterprise information management process for the command. We were the third deployment along with the Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) and the Army Sustainment Command (ASC).

PLEASANT: Can you discuss one or two significant issues that demanded your attention that you may not have expected?

HEWITT: One of them was NSPS, the National Security Personnel System, which was an attempt to institute a pay for performance system for the workforce. I was the pay pool manager for the headquarters and the approving authority for all the installation pay pools. Being the senior civilian for JMC, it was a responsibility that was certainly welcome, but it entailed a lot of effort on my part. Also, engaging with BRAC took a lot of effort. We had one particular issue of non-standard ammunition making the front page of New York Times. The Afghan Army was receiving ammunition bought through a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract that was let through the Security Assistance and Contracting enterprise here, but really there was no program management to that. It was more like, you need a buyer, we'll go out and look for the lowest bid and it caused problems. That was unexpected. There were hearings to the House Oversight and Reform Committee. General Phillips did a great job with that. But it highlighted, that we did the right thing with the rules in place at that time. Congress was asking, "who got fired over this?" Well, no one did because no one did anything wrong. It's just that the rules in place were unable to uncover that we were contracting with a 26 year old guy who was buying the ammunition; then doing the bait and switch with the Chinese ammo. The New York Times article highlighted the product that was purchased. That certainly took a lot of effort to address the problem we faced.

PLEASANT: Have there been any reforms to the process to avoid similar problems?

HEWITT: We installed a program director for non-standard ammunition who works with PEO Ammo and applied safety and processes instituted by the Defense Ammunition Center that we perform with our own ammunition to support FMS. Since we were buying ammunition from Bulgaria, Romania, etc. to support weapon systems the Afghanis were using, we didn't have the control of the manufacturing, quality, storage and other processes that we tightly control with our own ammunition. We were able to present some criteria that countries had to follow before we would purchase ammunition. That was one of the reforms that came out of that entire process.

PLEASANT: How important is the support JMC provides to manage ammunition and provide support to our service members in theater over the past 12 years?

HEWITT: The Joint Munitions Command has increased the readiness of the stockpile and its ability to provide the ammunition needed, which is critically important. This goes back to when Major General Wade H. McManus, Jr. was in command under the name of Operations Support Command (OSC). We really didn't have the right mechanism to see the state of the ammunition base or stockpile to determine if we had the right stockage levels to meet the Warfighter demands. We were red in so many categories if you applied a unit status reporting mechanism to the stockpile. Today, most of our ammunition families are green, and we are able to use the Munitions Readiness Report (MRR) to provide better predictability, forecasting, and match needs of the Warfighter with production.

PLEASANT: Did you have specific responsibilities with the Operation Ammunition Clean Sweep program?

HEWITT: We used our Quality Assurance Specialist (Ammunition Surveillance) (QASAS) primarily, but I wanted to make sure that employees with ammunition skill sets completed this type of work. What I've observed over the years, is that our Soldiers don't receive in depth ammunition training as a specialty. What used to be the Military Occupational Skill (MOS) 55 series, is now the 89 series of Soldiers who perform more of the accountability, like an Ammunition Manager would for a unit. But the number of those type of Soldiers are essentially gone. Within the military, there are no solid units that are maintaining management of ammunition. Without that, who do you go to get advice on whether ammunition is any good, what is the distance it needs to be stored away from other supplies or ammunition supply points, those sorts of things. We had units that did that and provided that type of service, but it started to atrophy away. Our QASAS and ammunition managers are the ones who hold that expertise. Our QASAS are mandatory mobile employees, who we can deploy to assess these issues out on the field. When we provide ammunition to a unit, we lose accountability, and it moves to their books. But when the units are moving around quickly, or are driving ammo from point A to point B in hot desert conditions, you need someone to assess if the ammunition is properly being taken care of. We lost that real expertise, that's when our QASAS came in when. We started to close down the Forward Operating Bases and needed to assess the condition of the ammunition on site, and that was all a part of Clean Sweep.

PLEASANT: You were the Functional Career Representative for the civilian career fields of CP 20, QASAS, and CP 33, Ammunition Managers. What did this responsibility require and what accomplishments can you attribute to your management?

HEWITT: This was a responsibility that I recognized as greater than JMC. I am responsible for the career management for maintaining the technical skill sets necessary for ammunition. We develop the career path for a person to come in at a fundamental area, and develop experience and expertise to become a manager or true expert in ammunition, whether it's from the QASAS side or from the ammo management side. We are providing the folks that have experience through assignments to the whole US Army and to various combatant commanders. Although

JMC has the majority of the positions, it's a worldwide responsibility. It required working with the Defense Ammunition Center schoolhouse for training people in those two career fields to ensure there is some sort of mechanism so you have the right skill sets at the right level job, and it is a developmental position. As we manage the overall inventory and ask how does this grow? How does a person come in at a GS-9 and develop into a GS-14 or 15? We have to think that through. There is a difference between what the quality assurance employees do and what the ammunition managers do. We need both at lower levels. But as you develop and become more senior and understand the overall management, the two fields start to merge. I tried to get them to become what I call the Super Ammo Manager, merging those two career fields at the highest levels.

At the same time, the Army recognized, if we are going to develop the total Army, we need to have a mechanism to develop civilians just like we develop the military. The military go through basic course, advanced course, the Command and General Staff College, then the Army War College. What's the equivalent for a civilian? They had to come up with a basic Army fundamentals course, leadership fundamentals, an advanced course, and so on. They were developing a more fundamental education and experience assignment system for civilians. And that's what I was trying to accomplish with the CP 20 and 33 programs. I wanted to at least get those systems to match where I believe where the big Army is trying to go. If you wanted to develop and move up, here's a path.

I also increased our acquisition corps workforce. I was the Acquisition Career Management Advocate (ACMA) for JMC. We started out in the low 30% range in terms of acquisition certification. Now we are between 60-80% certified, and that took hard work. I've watched the whole workforce become better.

PLEASANT: In 2011, you were selected to deploy as the Civilian Deputy of the Responsible Reset Task Force (R2TF) to assist with the draw down in Iraq for 90 days - what experiences stand out to you during this deployment?

HEWITT: That was an interesting assignment. General Dennis Via was the Deputy for AMC, and he wanted an SES to come over and help run the task force. I asked General Gustave Perna if he thought I should apply. He said, well you know if you apply you will get selected. I didn't think so but thought I'd take my chances. I applied and was selected. We were preparing to withdraw all equipment stationed in Iraq, in a very short period of time. My role was to help manage that process, and work closely with ARCENT and the 1st Theater Sustainment Command who was tasked with the responsibility to execute the withdrawal. It had to be synchronized so that as equipment was coming down, it was getting onto the ships according to schedule; first it has to be washed, cleaned, inventoried, and then moved out. It is mind boggling how much equipment we had whether it be wheeled vehicles (rolling stock) or containers. Some of it was high classified type of equipment that you had to maintain accountability of. Some of it was computers, communication equipment etc., but it is all part of accountability for the tax payer. For the rolling stock, we had to get it back into the resupply system and to the appropriate depot to go through the recap program, to be ready for the next deployment. The Army invested a lot of money into buying new Mine Resistant Armored Personnel Vehicles (MRAPs), High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), helicopters and more. In the course of

time of their use in Iraq, it was really pushed to the limit. We needed a mechanism to get that equipment back. The Army G-4 and AMC G-4 were pushing, asking how do we do this?

That was my role and early in my tour, interest in retrograding equipment from Afghanistan began. They started thinking, if we are going to withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014-2015, how do we get all the equipment out? General Via took a trip and met with the US Forces Afghanistan leaders, Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and started talking about what needs to happen. It was clear that the network to get things out of Afghanistan is far different than it was in Iraq. Coordinating with CSTC-A and USFOR-A and the logistics leadership with Afghanistan addressed what we needed to look at; what needed to be tracked; and assessed which processes we learned in Iraq, apply to Afghanistan. Initially, some were saying, that's Iraq, we don't do it that way here. But I said, we're not talking about that, we're trying to find out how to use data to measure performance, and increase ability to track. It took some work to do that, but that was one of the bigger issues.

By the time I left in February, we managed to get all the equipment out of Iraq and on the ships. That was very successful. There was no iron mountain of ammunition or materiel. However, I recall one hiccup as the forces were pushing all the equipment out. There was some FMS equipment that was supposed to stay. It came down into Kuwait, and we had to figure out how to get it back to Iraq, because all the funding mechanisms were turned off. That was my first introduction to LTG Robert Caslen, who was the Chief of Office of Security of Cooperation-Iraq. To get some of the equipment back through after they closed the border between Kuwait and Iraq, there were all types of interesting issues we had to work through. Coordination between 1st TSC and OSC-I solved the return of FMS items to Iraq.

PLEASANT: You were redeployed on a special assignment for one year as the Civilian Deputy for Offices of Security Cooperation - Iraq. Can you explain your mission and role in theater during this deployment?

HEWITT: They wanted me as the Executive Director for Support. If you think in a operational context for a division, you have a Deputy for operations and one for support. So I had the support role. We managed what used to be called Forward Operating Bases, we just called them OSC-I sites throughout Iraq. They had a very small number of military and contractors, performing the security assistance and cooperation role and FMS types of work in Iraq. Prior to my arrival, my predecessor was Ms. Diane Devens, from Installation Management Command and she said, whoever comes to replace me, needs to understand contracting a little better. An e-mail went out through LTG Caslen's office to HQ AMC asking for a replacement for Ms. Devens outlining what skills they were looking for. I read the description and thought that these sites were essentially government-owned, contractor-operated sites. I do that for ammunition sites, so how hard can that be? Well, it's Iraq, so that's number one lesson learned – Iraq operations are hard! But I felt I could do the job and applied through the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce. Again General Perna had said you know if you apply you will be selected. I thought the pool would be a little bigger, but sure enough I got selected for the job.

I prepared myself to go to Iraq for one year. I went over there thinking I can handle this. When I arrived, I was responsible for these bases and staff of civilians; a mayor; and directors for

logistics, public works, information and technology and force protection. That was the five people at each one of these sites, a handful of military who were advisors to the Iraqi Army, Air Force, or Navy depending on the location, with a host of contractors. The largest contractor in the field was Kellog Brown and Root (KBR), under the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) program. The Site Security Services-Iraq (SSSI) contract was for the security forces. My job was to oversee these sites and make sure that they could be run as bases. The logistics, supply, IT support, force protection, all these systems were working and that the contractors were providing all the services. Each site had close to 1000 personnel, some were bigger than others. One of the first problems I experienced was that the contract to provide vehicles for AEGIS (the security contractor), who were using the commercial vehicles we had left over from US Force-Iraq. But there was no mechanism to complete maintenance. We had to get it written into the contract. The way it was set up, was you had to have the security team to take people out there. They had to provide security during training or while providing equipment. Then the security guards come back – this was all contracted security. But if the vehicles were to break down, and they can't get back out within the field, we faced mission failure. In some places it was 130-140 degrees, and if the air conditioner didn't work, you couldn't keep the windows up, and this threatened security. That was a huge issue to work through. I called back to Rock Island and worked with the LOGCAP contracting teams to get the contracts modified. We also had incidents where contractors who were obligating 30 contractors to do a specific job, and only 15 would show up. My experience with holding contractors accountable helped, and I worked with the Procurement Contracting Officers (PCOs) back here at Rock Island frequently.

In late October, the Undersecretary for Defense, Undersecretary for State, and all the other agencies, made the decision that said the 16,000 members of Embassy Iraq had to be reduced. That was a turning point. We had to decide how to start closing bases, making them contractor-owned, contractor-operated bases, so they are no longer the responsibility of the US Government When you start to look at the FMS contracts, you start to see potential points when task orders were ending, indicating a potential time to change over. If we were able to close the base, change the operating structure of the base, and let the government of Iraq hand it over for contractor operations, then the numbers of the contractors working at those bases (essentially the numbers of people assigned to the Embassy) come off the books. That really started to take a majority of my time.

I had the pleasure of living on the beautiful Embassy compound, it was like a college campus. Right across the street from the Embassy and OSC-I was the Embassy Military Attached Security Assistance Annex (EMASAA), which was old FOB Union 1, where USF-I was located. The other part of my job was to help integrate the staff of OSC-I into the Embassy, because technically, the Office of Security Cooperation is under the Embassy. OSC-I belongs to CENTCOM but works for the Ambassador, so getting those roles and responsibilities understood, took a lot of work. Rules under the Department of Defense are not the same under Department of State. There was a time when the Regional Security Offices and our security guys (J-3) were talking past each other and we couldn't integrate. I was in charge of the transition team. I was pulling in our COLs and the counterpart with the State Department, (their O-6 level counterpart), to the table to talk about changes that needed to be made with security, finances and many systems in order to integrate. I was in charge of pulling all that together, and

running a quarterly IPR (In Progress Review) with the Deputy Chief of Mission and Deputy of Operations. It was interesting because the Department of State Inspector General (IG) came over for four weeks. There were discussions about OSC-I and the Embassy being unable to get along or talk to one another. I said, I didn't believe that was true. The IG sat in on some of the meetings and at first he thought it was all for show. Then he kept sitting in and he said, no, this is a process that is a best business practice that needs to be brought to Afghanistan. When they start changing over responsibilities from Department of Defense to Department of State, to run the country, we have the process in place. Event though it can be personality driven because you have to get people to see statistics and what needs to happen, and work towards the same accomplishments. It just takes communication, catching people down the halls or in the dining facilities, and then having the formal meetings to work through the issues at hand.

We had six sites and by the time I left, we had closed two sites. By the end of the fiscal year (FY) we'll close three more. By the end of the calendar year, we'll close the last one.

This was an exciting time in Iraq. At the same time, the Iraqis were buying the F-16s. When I first had arrived, the discussion was that the F-16s were going to go to Al Asad Air Base. Then, three or four months later, the Iraqis changed their minds and wanted them to go to Balad Air Base. All the work, surveying we had done; was money down the drain. They had said, oh by the way, we want to go to Balad without changing the date of delivery for the F-16s, which is September 2014. That was a time consuming issue.

Watching the government of Iraq evolve is interesting. You still see in the news there is a lot of sectarian violence ongoing. Baghdad is a center of gravity between the Shiite and the Sunni, and then up north is the Kurds. It's hard to get the Iraqi people to understand they are Iraqi first, and whatever tribe second. It will take some time. Here we are watching this and passing judgment, but if you go back and look at our own history, how long did it take for us to become unified as the United States of America. In fact we had our own Civil War. We have to understand that growth and experience will have to take place within the government of Iraq, to become a working democracy. They are what we call a nascent democracy, and it's fascinating. I believe I was watching history being made and at the same time honoring the 4,488 men and women who gave their lives for our Nation's security.

One of the unfortunate things about my deployment was - I told the Ambassador this - I feel like we are in the zoo. We're tied to our working locations. I got to travel between the sites via helicopter. I'm not getting to see the culture of the Iraqi people. I'm not getting to go to Babylon or all these biblical sites in Iraq. Someone else said, maybe we're not in the zoo, but the adult childcare center! Well, whatever you want to call it, we're restricted to our area and you spend your full year tour doing that. I didn't get the chance to appreciate the true culture. I did get the chance to have some Iftar meals after the Ramadan and meet with some of the senior Iraqi leaders. But I observed that the institutional parts of their government have a long way to go. After they became independent on 1 January 2012, the processes to get Visas, permissions to drive through the country, all those things had to be figured out, etc. Logistics was flat out hard. They were trying to institute things, but didn't want Asians or Africans, to get into the country for example. Because they were worried about AIDS and other things coming into the country. At the same time, a large population of the contractors we had working at the bases were made

up of those third country nationals. Many things we take for granted in the United States, they are still working through institutionally, and history is unfolding.

Back in January, there was a lot of press about a demonstration when the Iraqi Army tried to quell the demonstration and fired rounds and killed seven people. I immediately thought, that was wrong; but it wasn't that long ago in 1970 at Kent State we made some of the same mistakes in our Nation. Their governing bodies understand the challenges they are working through. Prime Minister al-Maliki is still in charge and thinks he wants to run for the next term. There is a Council of Ministers which is essentially the Cabinet, and a Council of Representatives, which is their Congress; and they have to work through all these sorts of issues.

PLEASANT: Can you describe any unique opportunities or experiences during this deployment?

HEWITT: One of the greater experiences I got out of the assignment was getting to work shoulder to shoulder with men and women in uniform. One of the things that struck me was seeing the rotation of primary staff out of OSC-I. I saw some fantastic Colonels leaving and I was asking how do you replace these guys? The replacements were just as fantastic, from all the Services. That says volumes about our own system for development of our leaders. They have a quality about them, a thinking process about the problem solving process, and a can-do attitude that is amazing. There is no manual on how to do Office of Security Cooperation work and how to work with the Department of State or Iraqi government. This about understanding what we need to accomplish, and I dealt with LTCs and COLs who had that ability and it was fantastic to work with them.

The other great experience was the ability to work hand in hand with the State Department. That's an experience extremely valuable for anyone. You see beyond what you know as Department of the Army. You bring what you know, but you have to listen to what they know and try to pull a rabbit out of the hat, in some cases. I learned that the State Department are not Powerpoint people. They are diplomats, they want to brainstorm and talk through the problem. It's a different thought process than what we are used to. On the sidelines you hear, those Army guys don't get it, they want to beat you to death with charts…but when you are talking in terms of diplomacy, you don't always want it in black and white. You want a concept that you can both understand and go forward. That realization was a learning experience for me. I always said as you develop, you want to put tools in your toolbox. Just because I'm the Deputy here, doesn't mean I know it all. We all continually learn and develop to make yourself a better leader for whatever organization.

PLEASANT: Thank you for discussing your deployment, I'll switch back to JMC questions. You haven't been heavily involved in our fiscal uncertainty issues, but do you have any thoughts about how the down turn in funding after our draw downs will affect JMC over the next three to five years?

HEWITT: Even though I was away from it, I was able to understand what's going on. OSC-I was contingency operations funded and it didn't affect us. Civilians in theater are not affected because they are in a combat, emergency essential environment. I had always said, even when I

was at McAlester AAP and started to watch the build up; even though we are building up, we will have to build down. It is not sustainable to stay at this level. What we have developed over the course of ten years is a set of expectations, that this is the way it will always be, and that is not true. We have to apply other business processes. Historically, after every major conflict we have, we build up and draw down. We need to be able to come down responsibly, and in such a way that we are not broke at the end of the conflict and maintain readiness within the ammunition base. So when the base is needed, and we don't know when; it's ready to go. That's where we have to go, but the expectation that we will continue to fill the coffers of our Nation in terms of bombs and bullets, is not a correct an assessment of where JMC needs to be. Yes there are some skill sets we need to retain, but all along, I said we need a plan to draw down, and I see where that's going.

A couple things helped. We completed BRAC and closed five ammunition plants and centers - but did we reduce the overall management of ammunition based on BRAC? You have to ask those sorts of questions. Is the stockpile correct? From the JM&L LCMC side, we've had ten years of War, are there some classes of ammunition that can be combined or eliminated? Everything is linked to the demands of the Warfighter, because the American people want to provide the Warfighter everything that he or she needs to be successful.

But watching the sequestration is distasteful. Furlough affects even me and is unfortunate, but it's difficult when we are told 80% of our effectiveness should be cut. Are we able to take that kind of risk? We have to track that. If we are able to accomplish everything we did before with an 80% cut of the workforce in terms of productivity, something is not quite right there.

What is disturbing is when Senators say in the paper, the sequestration is ugly, it's distasteful, but it is getting the job done – maybe we do it again. That becomes worrisome. Are we really going to get into that type of battle rhythm, until we understand Congress is telling us something here? We have to figure it out.

PLEASANT: What are the most significant lessons you've learned that have contributed to successful operation/command of the ammunition mission?

HEWITT: Behind the men and women in uniform is a corps of civilians who provide expertise and experience and they are selfless servants. They want to provide the best and ensure the Soldier, Sailor, Airmen, and Marine is getting ammunition when they need it, where they need it and it is safe. Joint Munitions Command does that. What it takes to be able to do that is having a strong unit mission, personal values, and a way to develop our people so we can continue to succeed. That's the most important thing. I've been able to put in place some systems to better track the development of our people. Let me also add safety. We work in an inherently dangerous environment. We must remain focused on safety, procedures, and accountability.

I've experienced watching the readiness of our ammunition maintain itself through thick and thin. When we get these fire missions to get ammunition to some location, we're ready to meet that particular mission and that's great.

My part with Lean Six Sigma was tremendous, and when you look at what JMC has been able to do in comparison to other AMC major subordinate commands, I think JMC is a shining star. You can see we are able to accomplish so much with just a handful of people.

But with all these great things we do, we have to become more incorporated into the AMC videos and messages! When you watch the AMC video, they don't mention what we do. That's important. We need to do better at that.

PLEASANT: That's good advice! Do you have any other advice for the command or leadership as you leave?

HEWITT: There is always discussion on where JMC goes, where does the JM&L go in the future. From a commodity perspective, if we are going to have commodity commands such as the Aviation and Missile Command, Communications and Electronics Command, Tank and Automotive Command; you still need an ammunition command. I believe General Benjamin Griffin was a strategic leader when he instituted the JM&L LCMC. We need some command that's integrated with the overall industrial base, understands what PEO Ammo is doing in terms of future development of ammunition, and the ARDEC for research and development. We do this mission for all of Department of Defense. My advice is don't let it go. We're a shining star, and if the Department of Defense wants to integrate this notion of acquisition, sustainment and R&D, pulling all those resources together to focus on ammunition; that provides the Soldier a better product.

PLEASANT: What are the significant differences leading as a SES vs. military officer?

HEWITT: As an SES, one of the things I had to learn was I'm a flag level officer who really works at the beck and call of the Commanding General of the Army Materiel Command or the Secretary of the Army. Being an SES gets you to the table of flag level discussions. There's a line between a SES and a Colonel or GS-15. You become more strategic operational, trying to move an organization versus operational and tactical at the lower level.

The other piece is getting to know that your counterparts are General Officers. That's a huge change and you have to get comfortable at that level. You have to let them know who you are and what you bring to the equation. I've learned the General Officer corps is far better connected because they've grown up from 2nd Lieutenants and they know each other. The SES Corps is more stovepiped. We know a few people outside the logistics field, but we don't know a whole lot outside unless you attend a course or some other environment. There are a couple of differences there.

PLEASANT: Lastly, is there anything further you would like to discuss or add to your comments.

HEWITT: This has been a great assignment. I offer great thanks to General Griffin, who sent me here to begin with. I also thank Major General James Rogers who selected me to be the SES and I know that was a tough competition. I try really hard to represent the civilians. I am a

retired Colonel, it's my background and who I am, but I really want to represent the civilians. I tried very hard to put JMC on the map as best as I could.

Even at our ammunition plants, you see the dedication. The workers are trying very hard to get the best product out the door for our Soldiers. We've had our tragedies and accidents. This is an inherently dangerous business. As principal advisor to the CG, you don't want anything to happen. I remember when I was the Deputy for Major General Robert Radin; I went to Tooele and told him they might tell him he doesn't have to wear the safety gear. But I said Sir, don't do that, set the example. There were a couple times when accidents occurred and there were deaths at Iowa and Milan Army Ammunition Plants; I felt those things stay with me. I continued to ask what we could have done better. As I go to RDECOM, R&D can be dangerous as well, so I'll make sure to have the same vigilance.

JMC has a great reputation and I will miss this place. I'm hoping I can make a difference at RDECOM. I have a Bachelor's degree in chemistry and a Master's degree in physics, so I believe RDECOM will be a tremendous opportunity for me. I will miss the Quad Cities, but most of all, the men and women of the Joint Munitions Command – not only here at the headquarters, but at our plants and depots.